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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Court of Appeals incorrectly apply the law, and improperly created new 
law, when it concluded Mrs. Bradford's conveyance of her undivided one half interest in 
real property to her son Mr. DeMita was a fraudulent conveyance because of "threats of 
divorce" by Mr. Bradford, even after the Court of Appeals determined Mr. Bradford's 
creditor claim (of inheritance) to Mrs. Bradford's undivided one half interest was not 
valid, and Mrs. Bradford retained her undivided one half interest in the property. 
OPINION ISSUED BY COURT OF APPEAL 
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion and ruling on December 16, 1999. Case 
number 981745-CA. 1999 UTApp 373. 
JURISDICTION 
The date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed is December 16, 1999. 
Order granting an extension of time to petition for certiorari was January 20,2000. 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Title VII Rule 45 
& 46 (a)(2,3, &4). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC. 
With respect to the issue of fraudulent conveyance, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act, as set forth in Section 25-6-1 et seq., of the Utah Code Annotated is determinative. A 
copy of said Act is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case came before the Fourth District Court on a Complaint for Divorce and Claim 
for fraudulent conveyance. The matter was tried to the Honorable Steven L. Hansen on 
March 4,1998, and Findings of Fact and a Decree of Divorce were entered on July 14,1998. 
Thereafter, defendants filed a timely Motion to Alter and Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree and the Court denied said Motion September 4,1998. The 
case was then timely appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals and a written ruling was entered 
into on December 16, 1999. Then this writ of certiorari followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford were married in June of 1985 in Provo, 
Utah, and have been husband and wife since that date. (Findings of Fact No. 1, page 152, 
Record.) 
2. Both parties have been married before, making this a second marriage 
for both parties. (Findings of Fact No. 4, page 152, Record.) 
3. No children were born of this marriage, but each had adult children from 
prior marriages. (Findings of Fact No. 5, page 151, Record.) 
4. Mr. Bradford is 63 years old and Mrs. Bradford is 65 years old. 
(Findings of Fact No. 6, page 151, Record.) 
5. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bradford are at a point in their life where they 
could be retrained or develop new skills for purposes of substantially increasing their income. 
(Findings of Fact No. 12, page 151, Record.) 
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6. Mr. Bradford intended to give Mrs. Bradford one-half of the marital 
residence property when he deeded her a joint tenancy interest in it and did so because he 
was happy with her, wanted to care for her, and loved her. (Record page 190, Trial transcript 
at page 56, line 11 through 13 and 25, and page 57, line 1 through 12.) 
7. Mr. Bradford deeded by way of warranty deed the property back to he 
and Mrs. Bradford as "joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in 
common" approximately four years after they had married. (Findings of Fact No. 18, page 
150, Record.) 
8. In 1992, Mr. Bradford filed for divorce from Mrs. Bradford. At that 
time, Mr. Bradford requested that the home and real property be awarded to him. This 
divorce action was dismissed in 1993. (Findings of Fact No. 19, page 150, Record.) 
9. Since 1992, Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford have had many arguments 
and Mr. Bradford has threatened to divorce Mrs. Bradford on many occasions. (Findings of 
Fact No. 20, page 150, Record.) 
10. On August 8,1996, Mrs. Bradford by way of Quit-Claim Deed deeded 
her share of the home to her son, James DeMita. Mr. DeMita gave his mother $ 10.00 for the 
deed. (Findings of Fact No. 24, page 149, Record.) 
11. When Mrs. Bradford deeded her half of the property to Mr. DeMita, she 
did so because she was concerned that if she predeceased him, her children would not get 
any of her interest in the property and she was not concerned at the time about Mr. Bradford 
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divorcing her, because of his repeated threats over the years. (Record page 190, Trial 
transcript at page 30, line 16 through 24.) 
12. Mrs. Bradford owed nothing to Mr. Bradford and was not indebted to 
him before or after she quit claimed the subject property to her son. (Record page 190, Trial 
Transcript at page 78, lines 2 through 7.) 
13. After the transfer, Mrs. Bradford and Mr. DeMita continued to live in 
the home as they had before. (Findings of Fact No. 29, page 149, Record.) 
14. The time between the granting of the Quit-Claim Deed in August of 
1996 and the filing of divorce was approximately eleven months. (Findings of Fact No. 31, 
page 148, Record.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A person asserting a fraudulent conveyance must be a creditor of the 
person claimed to have fraudulently conveyed the property. A person asserting fraudulent 
conveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the claim is valid. The Court 
of Appeals ruled against Mr. Bradford's "clainT of inheritance to the property and Mrs. 
Bradford retained her undivided one half interest in the property, then the Court improperly 
created its own new classification of creditor, "threats of divorce" under the Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act. The Court of Appeals admits in its opinion there is no Utah case law to 
support its new classification of "threats of divorce," therefore, the Court is improperly 
creating new law, and misapplying existing law, by stating "threats of divorce" create a 
creditor claim under the Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Consequently, the threshold element a 
legitimate claim proven by clear and convincing evidence, of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
fails. 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the threshold question to be 
answered in a fraudulent conveyance case is whether a party claiming a fraudulent 
conveyance is a creditor of the party who has allegedly fraudulently transferred property. It 
has stated that a creditor must prove by clear and convincing evidence that claimant is a 
creditor. Territorial Savings & Loan v. Baird. 781 P.2d 452,458 (Utah 1989), Furniture v. 
Deamen 680 P.2d 398,399 (Utah 1984), and Meyer v. General Amer. Corp., 569 P.2d 1094, 
1096 (Utah 1977). Moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court in Clark v. Rossow, 657 P.2d 903, 
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904 (Az. 1982) stated that the Fraudulent Conveyance Act does not itself create a new claim. 
If a claim does not exist outside of the Act, there is no remedy. Utah's Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act only refers to debtors and creditors and specifically states at Section 25-6-5, 
U.C.A. under the caption "Fraudulent Transfer" "(1) a transfer made or obligation incurred 
by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, . . . " A non-creditor of a person transferring 
property cannot assert a claim under the Fraudulent Transfer Act to set aside the conveyance 
of property by a party who is not his debtor. 
In the present case, husband deeded property that was the marital residence and that 
husband owned separately prior to the marriage to himself and wife in joint tenancy 
approximately eight years prior to commencement of the divorce proceedings. Husband's 
testimony at trial admits that wife owed him nothing and that she was not indebted to him 
before or after she gave her son the Quit Claim Deed to her undivided one-half interest in the 
property. 
If the Fraudulent Conveyance Act by itself does not make husband the creditor of wife 
and if husband admits that wife never owed him any money, then husband's only basis for 
being a creditor under the Fraudulent Transfer Act is that he wants the one-half of the 
property that he deeded to his wife back. 
The Court of Appeals ruled Mr. Bradford's claim arose out of "threats of divorce" 
during the marriage (Note: Mr. Bradford's claim is the property was inherited, so he should 
be able to get it back, and that was his "creditor claim," the Court of Appeals created a 
different claim, "threats of divorce," then Mr. Bradford was even asserting.) The Court of 
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Appeals admits in %l 5 of its opinion there is no Utah case law to support its ruling. Bradford 
v. Bradford. 1999 UT App 373. The Court in [^15 of the opinion cites to a 1975 Oregon 
Supreme Court ruling to support its analysis. Adamson v. Adamson. 541 p.2d 460 (Or. 1975). 
Although the Oregon case is not precedent for Utah law, a brief analysis of the case is in 
order since the Court included it in its analysis. 
Adamson involved a husband and wife owning a half interest jointly as tenants by the 
entirety along with Husband's Mother; husband and his father Coerced and duressed wife 
into conveying joint title to husband's father. 541 p.2d460(Or. 1975). Husband and wife 
were living separately, wife was sick with her pregnancy, wife had confidential relationship 
with father in law and trusted him completely, wife was threatened, harassed, did not know 
what she was signing, husband had been unemployed and having financial difficulties, and 
this was husband's only tangible asset in which to pay any child support. 541 p.2d 460,464-
465 (Or. 1975). The Oregon Court found for wife to set aside the conveyance from her and 
her husband to her father in law. id. 466. 
In the Adamson case, the creditor relationship, in so many words, was husband's child 
support obligation and his lack of means in which to pay it, not "threats of divorce", id. In 
our case, Mr. And Mrs. Bradford had no children together, and no claims by either party of 
child support were made, therefore, the Adamson case is not comparable to this case before 
this court, id. 
If the Court of Appeals ruling were to stand, it will set a whole new category in the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, namely, a creditor must prove by clear and convincing 
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evidence he or she is a creditor, unless they are husband and wife and one party threatens 
divorce during the marriage, id. 
This would be against good public policy as well; This would treat married 
individuals property rights different from non-married individuals property rights; Title 
companies, grantees, and others, would have to ensure there were no 'threats of divorce" 
leaved from either married grantor before receiving property from one of them; This leaves a 
greater potential of abuse from married grantors; if a grantor changed their mind about a 
conveyance, the non grantor spouse could claim there were "threats of divorce," and petition 
to rescind the conveyance as fraudulent. This could severely restrict the alienability of 
property. 
Mrs. Bradford owned a one-half interest in joint tenancy in the marital residence and 
had a right to use it as she desired, indeed, the Court of Appeals ruled she has an undivided 
one-half interest. There is numerous Jurisprudence that supports Mrs. Bradford's right to use 
it separately how she desires [ "The transfer of once separate property into joint names of 
both spouses is deemed a gift." (41 C.J.S. Section 103). "An interspousal gift operates as a 
transfer to the donee spouse of a separate property interest." (41 C.J.S. Section 102). "A gift 
from a husband to his wife confers on the wife good title..., and is not impliably limited to 
the duration of the marriage." (41 C.J.S. Section 102). "A gift from a wife to her husband is 
binding as a transaction between other persons . . . . The husband cannot be compelled to 
return the money or property given nor can the wife reclaim or recover it." (41 C.J.S. Section 
102)]. Mrs. Bradford was concerned if she predeceased Mr. Bradford, her children would 
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not get any of her interest in the property, so she conveyed her interest to her son. Nothing 
placed into evidence by husband created a basis for a claim against wife to meet the threshold 
requirements of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, nor has the Court of Appeals shown 
anything to satisfy the "clear and convincing" requirement under the act. id. 
Definitive evidence that Mr. Bradford had no valid creditor claim against Mrs. 
Bradford is the fact that Mrs. Bradford retains her undivided one half interest in the property. 
The Court did not award Mr. Bradford, on any claim, or any portion of Mrs. Bradford's 
undivided one half interest, id. If Mr. Bradford is a valid creditor of Mrs. Bradford, then that 
amount Mrs. Bradford was indebted to him would have been taken out of her undivided one 
half interest. This was not done, because Mrs. Bradford owes nothing to Mr. Bradford, and 
Mr. Bradford has no legitimate claim. 
Therefore, the court's determination that conveyance of this property to her son was 
fraudulent should be reversed and the court should declare that husband and appellant, Mr. 
DeMita, each own a one-half interest in said property in common. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no evidence or legal precedent to support finding that Mr. Bradford was 
Mrs. Bradford's creditor and, therefore, a fraudulent conveyance fails. Appellant prays that 
this Court reverse the Court of Appeal's ruling with respect to the fraudulent conveyance and 
declare that Mr. Bradford and appellant, Mr. DeMita, each own a one-half interest in said 
property in common. 
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DATED February 14,2000. 
mes DeMittfTAppellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this \£ day of February, 2000, to the following: 
Thomas R. Patton 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
Attorneys for Plaintiff7Appellee 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box AL@ 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 ^  m 
10 
£tfiBiTA 
Utah Code Annotated §25-6-5 
24 
1101 FRAUD 25-6-2 
CHAPTER 6 
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25-6-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act." 1988 
25-6-2. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate* means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, con-
trols, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the 
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other 
than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discre-
tionary power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstand-
ing voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, 
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or 
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or 
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the out-
standing voting securities of the debtor, other than a 
person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power 
to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the 
debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person 
substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the 
debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business 
under a lease or other agreement or controls substan-
tially all of the debtors assets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not 
include: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a 
valid lien; 
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt 
under nonbankruptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the 
entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by 
a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not 
the right is reduced to judgment, Hquidated, unliqui-
dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim. 
(7) "Insider" includes: 
(a) if the debtor is an individual: 
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general 
partner of the debtor; 
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner; 
(iii) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(aXii); 
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a 
director, officer, or person in control; or 
(v) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager; 
(b) if the debtor is a corporation: 
(i) a director of the debtor; 
(ii) an officer of the debtor; 
(iii) a person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner; 
(v) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(b)(iv); 
(vi) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vii) a relative of a general partner, director, 
officer, or person in control of the debtor; 
(c) if the debtor is a partnership: 
(i) a general partner in the debtor; 
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(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general 
partner of, or a person in control of the debtor; 
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is 
a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7XcXiii); 
(v) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vi) a person in control of the debtor, 
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company: 
(i) a member or manager of the debtor, 
(ii) another limited liability company in which 
the debtor is a member or manager; 
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7XdXiii); 
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or 
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member, 
manager, or person in control of the debtor; 
(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the 
affiliate were the debtor; and 
(f) a managing agent of the debtor. 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in 
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an 
obligation, and includes a security interest created by 
agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable 
process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory 
lien. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited 
liability company, corporation, association, organization, 
government or governmental subdivision or agency, busi-
ness trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial 
entity. 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the sub-
ject of ownership. 
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual 
related to a spouse, related by consanguinity within the 
third degree as determined by the common law, or a 
spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive rela-
tionship within the third degree. 
(12) Transfer* means every mode, direct or indirect, 
absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of 
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an 
asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and 
creation of a lien or other encumbrance. 
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against 
the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal 
or equitable process or proceedings. 1992 
25-6-3. Insolvency. 
( D A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is 
greater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation. 
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they 
become due is presumed to be insolvent. 
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the 
sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate, 
at a fair valuation, of all of the partnership's assets and the 
sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's 
nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership 
debts. 
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that 
has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred 
in a manner making the transfer voidable under this chapter. 
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to 
the extent it is secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor 
not included as an asset. 1988 
25-6-4. Value — Transfer. 
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in 
exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred 
or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied. However, value 
does not include an unperformed promise made other than in 
the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish 
support to the debtor or another person. 
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(lXb) and Section 25-6-6, a 
person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person 
acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a 
regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution 
of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the 
interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of 
trust, or security agreement 
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange 
between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to 
be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contempora-
neous. 1988 
25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim aris ing before or 
• after transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is 
fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose 
before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the 
obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any 
creditor of the debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for the -transfer or obligation; and the debtor 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a busi-
, ness or a transaction for which the remaining assets 
of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to 
the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably 
should have believed that he would incur, debts 
beyond his ability to pay as they became due. 
(2) Tb determine "actual intent" under Subsection (lXa), 
consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider, 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the 
property transferred after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or con-
cealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was 
incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with 
suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's 
assets; 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the 
debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset 
transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly 
after the transfer was made or the obligation was in-
curred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after 
a substantial debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the 
business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an 
insider of the debtor. 1888 
25-6-6. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before 
transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is 
fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the 
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obli-
gation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for the transfer or obligation; and 
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became 
insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation. 
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(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the 
transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the 
debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had reason-
able cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent its* 
25-6-7. Transfer — When made, 
In this chapter: 
(1) A transfer is made: 
(a) with respect to an asset that is real property 
other than a fixture, but including the interest of a 
seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the 
asset, when the transfer is so far perfected that a 
good-faiiii purchaser of the asset from the debtor 
against whom applicable law permits the transfer to 
be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset 
that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and 
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real prop-
erty or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far 
perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot 
acquire a judicial lien other than under this chapter 
' that is superior to the interest of the transferee. 
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be per-
fected as provided in Subsection (1) and the transfer is not 
so perfected before the commencement of an action for 
relief under this chapter, the transfer is deemed made 
immediately before the commencement of the action. 
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be 
perfected as provided in Subsection (1), the transfer is 
made when it becomes effective between the debtor and 
the transferee. 
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired 
rights in the asset transferred. 
(5) An obligation is incurred: 
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective between the 
parties; or 
(b) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing 
executed by the obligor is delivered to or for the 
benefit of the obligee. 1968 
25-6-8. Remedie s of creditors . 
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation 
under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in 
Section 25-6-9, may obtain: 
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent 
necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim; 
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against 
the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in 
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in 
accordance wiith applicable rules of civil procedure: 
(i) an iigunction against further disposition by the 
debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset trans-
ferred or of other property; 
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the 
asset transferred or of other property of the trans-
feree; or 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may re-
quire. 
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against 
the debtor, the creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution 
on the asset transferred or its proceeds. 1968 
25-6-9. Good faith transfer. 
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Subsection 
25-6-5(1 Xa) against a person who took in good faith and for a 
reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent trans-
feree or obligee. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the 
extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under 
Subsection 25-6-8(1 Xa), the creditor may recover judgment for 
the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under Subsec-
tion (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's 
claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered 
against: 
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for 
whose benefit the transfer was made; or 
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith 
transferee who took for value or from any subsequent 
transferee. 
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the 
value of the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an 
amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the 
transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may require. 
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obliga-
tion under this chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is 
entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor for the 
transfer or obligation, to: 
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset 
transferred; 
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or 
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the 
judgment 
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1 Kb) 
or Section 25-6-6 if the transfer results from: 
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor 
when the termination is pursuant to the lease and appli-
cable law; or 
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance 
with Title 70A, Chapter 9, the Uniform Commercial Code. 
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-6(2): 
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the 
benefit of the debtor after the transfer was made unless 
the new value was secured by a valid lien; 
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business or finan-
cial affairs of the debtor and the insider, or 
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabili-
tate the debtor and the transfer secured present value 
given for that purpose as well as an antecedent debt of the 
debtor. itss 
25-6-10. Claim for rel ief — Time l imits . 
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a fraudulent 
transfer or obligation under this chapter is extinguished 
unless action is brought: 
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(1 Xa), within four years 
after the transfer was made or the obligation was in-
curred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or 
obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered 
by the claimant; 
(2) under Subsection 25-6-5(lXb) or 25-6-6(1), within 
four years after the transfer was made or the obligation 
was incurred; or -
(3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year after 
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred. 
1968 
25-6-11. Legal principles appl icable to chapter. 
Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles of law and 
equity, including merchant law and the law relating to prin-
cipal and agent, equitable subordination, estoppel, laches, 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insol-
vency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement 
this chapter's provisions. 1988 
25-6-12. Construct ion of chapter. 
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the 
subject of this chapter among states enacting it. 1988 
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The above entitled matter came before the Court for trial on March 4, 1998. The Plaintiff was 
present and represented by counsel, Thomas R. Patton. Defendants were also present and represented 
by counsel, Howard Chuntz. The Court having heard testimony and evidence and being sufficiently 
advised in the premises now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford were married in June of 1985 in Provo, Utah and have been 
husband and wife since that date. 
2. Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford are and have been residents of Utah County, Utah for at least 
three months prior to the commencement of this action. 
3. There have arisen irreconcilable differences between Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford thai 
make the continuation of this marriage no longer viable. 
4. Both parties have been married before, making this a second marriage for both parties. 
1 5. No children were born of this marriage, but each had adult children from prior marriages. 
2 6. Mr. Bradford is 63 years old and Mrs. Bradford is 65 years old. 
3 7. At the time of the parties' marriage, Mrs. Bradford had limited assets other than her personal 
4 property and some property in Indianola which eventually sold for $5000.00. However, Mr. Bradford 
5 gave Mrs. Bradford the funds whose returns were eventually used to pay oflf the debt on the Indianola 
6 land. Mrs. Bradford kept the returns on the sale of the Indianola land for herself. 
7 8. Mr. Bradford worked at Geneva Steel before the parties married and subsequently obtained 
8 other training and is now a janitor with Nebo School District. 
9 9. Mr. Bradford receives $410.00 from his current employment at Nebo School District, $769.00 
10 from Social Security, and $324.00 from his pension and $50.00 rent from the property for a total of 
11 $1553.00 net per month. The Court notes that Mr. Bradford pays approximately $105.00 per month into 
12 a retirement account at the school district. Since that payment is discretionary, the Court will add this 
13 to his net income for a total of $1658.00. 
14 10. Mrs. Bradford has worked at temporary jobs, but has not worked for many years as she 
15 claims that she has carpal tunnel syndrome and has difficulty focusing on her task. 
16 11. Mrs. Bradford receives approximately $150.00 for child care of her grandchild, and $381.00 
17 in Social Security for a total of $531.00 per month. 
18 12. The Court finds that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bradford are in a point in their life where they 
19 could be retained or develop new skills for purposes of substantially increasing their income. 
20 13. Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford have lived in the home in Spanish Fork, Utah since the 
21 marriage. This home was paid for and given to Mr. Bradford as part of his inheritance before the 
22 marriage. Mr. Bradford was born and raised in this house. This house has been owned by Mr. 
23 Bradford's family for many generations and has been passed down within the family from generation to 
24 I 
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1 generation. 
2 14. The Court finds that since the marriage of the parties that there have been improvements to 
3 the house in that the roof was repaired, a furnace was added, and the septic system had been repaired and 
4 the home was hooked up to city water. 
5 15. Although Mrs. Bradford claims to have been an integral part of the improvements, the Court 
6 finds that she merely made phone calls and arrangements to have the work completed. Any other 
7 projects, such as painting, which she did were not improvements but along the lines of general repair and 
8 maintenance of the home. 
9 16. The repairs and improvements were paid for through funds which Mr. Bradford received 
10 from a settlement with Geneva Steel. These funds were accumulated prior to the marriage. 
11 17. It is undisputed that the house is worth approximately $180,000.00. 
12 18. Mr. Bradford deeded by way of warranty deed the property back to he and Mrs. Bradford 
13 as "joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common" approximately four years 
14 after they had married. 
15 19. In 1992, Mr. Bradford filed for divorce form Mrs. Bradford. At that time, Mr. Bradford 
16 requested that the home and real property be awarded to him. This divorce action was dismissed in 1993. 
17 20. Since 1992, Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford have had many arguments and Mr. Bradford 
18 has threatened to divorce Mrs. Bradford on many occasions. 
19 21. James Demita, Mrs. Bradford's adult son, has been living with Mr. Bradford and Mrs. 
20 Bradford since 1995. Mr. Demita's minor son also stays at the home from time to time. Mr. Demita 
21 stays rent free, although he is supposed to be pay the utilities. 
22 22. Mr. Demita went to one year of law school and has since worked odd jobs. At the time of 
23 the trial, Mr. Demita was working part-time at a computer store. His 1996 gross income was only 
24 
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1 approximately $3500.00. 
2 23. In 1996, the parties began to jointly develop land for rezoning, division into lots and sale. 
3 They hired LSI Inc. to survey the ground, prepare a subdivision plat and perform other pre-sales work. 
4 Mr. Demita was to receive 25% of the profits form the sale for his assistance in developing the property. 
5 24. In July of 1996, Mr. Bradford came home to various engineers at his home. Although the 
6 reasons for the ensuing argument with Mrs. Bradford are in dispute, Mr. Bradford was upset with the 
7 way the development was proceedings. This particular argument was more sever than prior arguments 
8 and divorce was discussed. 
9 25. On August 8,1996, Mrs. Bradford by way of Quit-claim Deed deeded her share of the home 
10 to her son James Demita. Mr. Demita gave his mother $10.00 for the deed. 
11 26. The Court finds that $10.00 was not equivalent value of one-half of the house and property. 
12 27. The Court finds that the transfer of the Quit-claim Deed was made to an "insider" according 
13 to Utah law as Mr. Demita is Mrs. Bradford's son. 
14 28. Mrs. Bradford claimed that the transfer to Mr. Demita was for estate planning purposes. 
15 However, she acknowledged that she only deeded the property to him and not her other five children, 
16 and that she did not have nor did she prepare a will at that time nor were instructions given regarding the 
17 disposition of the property. 
18 29. After the transfer, Mrs. Bradford and Mr. Demita continued to live in the home as they had 
19 before. 
20 30. Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. Demita told Mr. Bradford of the Quit-claim Deed. Mr. 
21 I Bradford subsequently discovered the deed when his daughter went to the County Recorder's Office, 
22 Mr. Bradford's daughter went to the recorder's office to verify that the home and property had beer 
23 rezoned for development as Mr. Demita had indicated to them. The daughter then discovered the Quit 
24 
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1 claim Deed and that in actuality the property had not been rezoned. 
2 31. Soon after the discovery of this information, Mr. Bradford filed for this divorce action. The 
3 time between the granting of the Quit-claim Deed in August of 1996 and the filing of divorce was 
4 approximately eleven months. 
5 32. The transfer of Mrs. Bradford's portion of the home to her son left her in possession of only 
6 her personal property, which has limited value. Thus, this transfer constituted a transfer of substantially 
7 all of her assets. 
8 33. When asked on cross examination whether she could afford to pay Mr. Bradford one-half 
9 of the value of the property, Mrs. Bradford indicated that she did not have the funds and would have to 
10 look to family members to assist her if she were obligated to pay this. 
11 34. At the time of the transfer of the Quit-claim Deed, Mrs. Bradford should have reasonably 
12 believed that Mr. Bradford might file a divorce action and that he would probably claim the home and 
13 property as his before the marriage as he had done so in the divorce action which he filed in 1992. 
14 35. The Court finds that the house and property is in fact not partitionable as it contains a 
15 residence, road and river frontage. If an interest were to be conveyed the house would have to be 
16 refinanced or sold. 
17 36. Even though Mr. Bradford placed Mrs. Bradford's name on the new deed to the house, the 
18 Court finds that the house and property belong to Mr. Bradford as he inherited this from his father before 
19 the marriage. This is consistent with previous Utah Supreme Court Decisions wherein the parties married 
20 later in life and one of the parties had brought into the marriage a significant asset which they later deeded 
21 to the other spouse and subsequendy were divorced. See Georgedes vs. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44 (Utat 
22 1981); Jesperson vs. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). 
23 37. Mr. Bradford earns $1926.00 per month. He nets approximately $1658. His financia 
24 
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1 declaration indicates that his monthly expenses are $1000.00 per month without rent or a mortgage 
2 payment. The Court finds that these expenses are reasonable and necessary. 
3 38. Mr. Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month after necessary expenses. Mr. Bradford 
4 would also have at his disposal the house and property which do not currently have a mortgage and are 
5 worth approximately $180,000.00. 
6 39. Mrs. Bradford nets $531.00 per month. She listed her expenses at $1750 which includes 
7 $600.00 for rent (which she is currently not paying). This leaves Mrs. Bradford with a shortfall of 
8 approximately $1200.00 per month. Mrs. Bradford is 65 years old, not trained in an employable skill, and 
9 has health concerns. She gives part-time child care to her grandson for which she is paid $150.00 per 
10 month. Although she may be able to earn more from child care, there was insufficient evidence that she 
11 would be able to find such a position or that even if she were to increase her child care hours that it 
12 would meet her shortfall. Thus, the Court finds that Mrs. Bradford has a need for alimony. 
13 40. Mrs. Bradford has expenses which exceed her income and cannot make up the shortfall. Mr. 
14 Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month in income which exceeds his expenses. Therefore, Mr. 
15 Bradford shall pay Mrs. Bradford $600.00 per month in alimony for a term not exceeding the length of 
16 the marriage. This would give $1131.00 to Mrs. Bradford to meet her expenses and leave $1058.00 for 
17 Mr. Bradford's expenses. 
18 41. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have acquired the following personal property during the marriage 
19 which property had value at the time of the trial as follows: 
20 First Security Bank Accounts: $6492.00 
21 ValicIRA $2418.00 
22 Utah Retirement $1583.00 
23 Insurance Policy Cash Value $3990.00 
24 
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11 42. The Court finds that each party should be awarded one-half of the total sum of the above 
2 personal property. The remainder of the personal property has been divided between the parties and the 
3 same should be awarded as divided. 
4 Having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters it: 
5 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
6 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code 
7 Ann. § 78-3-4(1). 
8 2. The parties are entitled to a Decree of Divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences. 
9 3. The Court concludes pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(4) and § 25-6-5 that Mr. Bradford 
10 is a creditor of Mrs. Bradford in that he has a claim to the real property which Mrs. Bradford deeded to 
11 her son, Mr. Demita. 
12 4. The Court concludes that this transfer between Mr. Bradford and Mr. Demita was made to 
13 an insider pursuant to § 25-6-2(7) of the Utah Code. 
14 5. The Court concludes that this transfer made Mrs. Bradford insolvent, according to § 25-6-3 
15 of the Utah Code, as her debts exceeded her income after the transfer was made. 
16 6. According to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5, the Court concludes that the transfer 
17 by Mrs. Bradford to her son Mr. Demita was a fraudulent transfer. The Court looks to the fact that Mrs. 
18 Bradford only received $10.00 for the Quit-claim Deed, not an equivalent value, and that she believed 
19 or reasonably should have believed that she would incur debts beyond her ability to pay if she were 
20 divorced from Mr. Bradford. The Court also looks to the evidence and applies it to the factors listed in 
21 § 25-5-6(2) and notes that the transfer was concealed from Mr. Bradford, Mrs. Bradford continued to 
22 live in the house as before, Mr. Bradford had threatened Mrs. Bradford with divorce a matter of weeks 
23 before the transfer, and the transfer was substantially all of the assets that Mrs. Bradford believed that 
24 
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she had. 
7. The Court accordingly sets aside the transfer that Mrs. Bradford made to Mr. Demita as the 
transfer was a fraudulent conveyance. 
8. The Court concludes that the property and the house are Mr. Bradford's as he inherited them 
before the marriage, the parties married later in life for twelve years with no children of issue of the 
marriage and that Mrs. Bradford brought minimal assets into the marriage and contributed little financially 
to the improvements on the house. 
9. Since Mrs. Bradford has a need for alimony in the amount of nearly $1200.00 which she 
cannot substantially reduce, and since Mr. Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month at his disposal 
after expenses, the Court concludes that Mr. Bradford pay $600 per month alimony to Mrs. Bradford 
which payment shall not exceed the length of the marriage. 
10. The Court concludes that the parties shall divide equally the accounts listed in Finding 
number 41. 
11. Each party has requested attorneys' fees; however, neither party has submitted testimony 
regarding that issue. Therefore,/each party shall pay their own costs and attorney's fees. 
7l998. 
BY THE COURT: 
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THOMAS R. PATTON (2542) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff M!COOt:W UPD '1,1*1 <*</ 43 East 200 North "*" — L M K L U. (/_ /Q 
P.O. Box ML 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
Telephone: 373-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE R BRADFORD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREA O. BRADFORD and JAMES A. 
DEMITA, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 974401237 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
The above entitled matter came before the Court for trial on March 4,1998. The Plaintiff was 
present and represented by counsel, Thomas R Patton. Defendants were also present and represented 
by counsel, Howard Chuntz. The Court having heard testimony and evidence and being sufficiently 
advised in the premises and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now 
enters the following: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-4(1). 
2. The parties are granted a Decree of Divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences. 
3. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(4) and § 25-6-5 Mr. Bradford is a creditor of Mrs. 
Bradford in that he has a claim to the real property which Mrs. Bradford deeded to her son, Mr. Demita. 
4. This transfer between Mr. Bradford and Mr. Demita was made to an insider pursuant to § 25-
1 6-2(7) of the Utah Code. 
2 5. This transfer made Mrs. Bradford insolvent, according to § 25-6-3 of the Utah Code, as her 
3 debts exceeded her income after the transfer was made. 
4 6. According to the provisions of Utah Code Ana § 25-6-5, the transfer by Mrs. Bradford to her 
5 son Mr. Demita was a fraudulent transfer. The Court looks to the fact that Mrs. Bradford only received 
6 $10.00 for the Quit-claim Deed, not an equivalent value, and that she believed or reasonably should have 
7 believed that she would incur debts beyond her ability to pay if she were divorced from Mr. Bradford. 
8 I The Court also looks to the evidence and applies it to the factors listed in § 25-5-6(2) and notes that the 
9 transfer was concealed from Mr. Bradford, Mrs. Bradford continued to live in the house as before, Mr. 
10 Bradford had threatened Mrs. Bradford with divorce a matter of weeks before the transfer, and the 
11 transfer was substantially all of the assets that Mrs. Bradford believed that she had. 
12 7. The Court accordingly sets aside the transfer that Mrs. Bradford made to Mr. Demita as the 
13 11 transfer was a fraudulent conveyance. Therefore, Mr. Bradford is awarded all right title and interest in 
14 the property located at 1100 South Main, Spanish Fork, Utah. The property is more particularly 
15 described as: 
16 I Parcel No. 2: Beginning at a point which is West 322.35 feet and North 1288.95 feet 
from the East quarter corner of Section 25, Township 8 South, Range 2 East, of the Salt 
17 || Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 89© 53* 7" West 259.68 feet; thence South 1© 42' 
11" West 71.44 feet; thence South 59© 44' 38M West 313.10 feet; thence North 66o 59' 
18 || 34" West along the North bank of the Spanish Fork River 668.40 feet; thence along said 
river bank South 87o 48' 04M West 592.12 feet; thence North 47o 54' 45M West 140.69 
19 || feet; thence North 65o 44' 29H East 1150.07 feet; thence South 52o 37 40H East 509.07 
feet; thence South 58© 16' 44" East 122.86 feet; thence North 38© 08' 23" East 7.40 feet; 
20 || thence South 68© 07 31H East 188.79 feet; thence South 88© 17 42H East 110.24 feet; 
thence South 1© 4V 54" West 134.30 feet to the point of beginning. 
21 
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Together with 13 shares in the Spanish Fork Southeast Irrigation Company. 
8. Since Mrs. Bradford has a need for alimony in the amount of nearly $1200.00 which she 
cannot substantially reduce, and since Mr. Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month at his disposal 
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after expenses, the Court orders that Mr. Bradford pay $600 per month alimony to Mrs. Bradford which 
payment shall not exceed the length of the marriage. 
19. The Court orders that the parties shall divide equally the accounts listed below: 
First Security Bank Accounts: $6492.00 
ValicIRA $2418.00 
Utah Retirement $ 1583.00 
Insurance Policy Cash Value $3990.00 
11. The Court orders that^ each wtrty shall pay their own costs and attorney's fees 
DATED this /*f day ofJu/ie,/?998. 
BY THE COURT: 
STE^EtfL 
DistrictCourt Judge 
Approved as to Form 
i 
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Howard Chuntz 
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4 foregoing Order to the Honorable Steven L. Hansen for his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
Howard Chuntz, No. 4208 
Attorney for Defendant 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801)222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE R. BRADFORD, 
MOTION TO ALTER AND 
Plaintiff, AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
v. DECREE 
ANDREA O. BRADFORD and JAMES A. 
DEMITA, 
Civil No. 974401237CS 
Defendants. Judge Steven L. Hansen 
/ 
COME NOW defendants in the above captioned matter, by and through their attorney, 
Howard Chuntz, and move the Court to alter and amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and the Decree of Divorce entered in this matter pursuant to Rules 52(b) and 59(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Findings of Fact at paragraph 18 reflect that Mr. Bradford deeded the property to 
he and Mrs. Bradford in joint tenancy, but do not reflect any statement concerning Mr. 
Bradford's intent or the reason for doing so. The Findings of Fact should be amended to include 
two additional findings as follows: 
a. When Mr. Bradford deeded the property to Mrs. Bradford in joint tenancy, it 
was his intent to give her half the property. (See video tape at 2:35:30-48 and 3:09:45-3:10:05). 
b. Mr. Bradford gave half of the property to Mrs. Bradford because he wanted 
her to have half, because he wanted to take care of her and because he loved her. (See video 
tape at 2:36:27-51 and 3:44:20-50). 
The Court's Findings of Fact reflect at paragraph 19 that at the time of the 1992 divorce 
proceedings, Mr. Bradford requested that the home and real property be awarded to him and that 
that action was dismissed in 1993. There should be additional findings of fact to reflect that Mr. 
Bradford took no action nor made any demand of Mrs. Bradford for a reconveyance of the 
subject property subsequent to the 1992 divorce until filing again in 1997. 
The Court should find that at the time Mrs. Bradford quit claimed her interest in the 
property to Mr. DeMita, she was not indebted to Mr. Bradford. (See video tape at 3:07:20-30). 
There is no evidence to support finding no. 34 that Mrs. Bradford should have reasonably 
believed that Mr. Bradford might file a divorce action and that he would probably claim the 
home and property as he had done so in the divorce action in 1992. From the facts and 
circumstances adduced at trial and under which the parties lived, Mrs. Bradford could just have 
reasonably believed that Mr. Bradford had given up any demand for a return of half of the 
property that he gave to her. This belief could be reasonably founded on the basis that there had 
been no further demand to deliver the property to him during the intervening four to five years, 
despite the numerous threats of divorce, and in addition, because the parties continued to deal 
with the property as joint owners, particularly with respect to their efforts to develop and sell 
lots in the property. In fact, it seems more reasonable that Mrs. Bradford should have expected 
that any issue concerning demand for return of the property was long in the past and that she and 
Mr. Bradford, in fact, each owned one-half because the parties continued to work together to 
develop and sell the property after the "severe argument and discussion of divorce in July of 
1996 and the fact that no divorce action took place for a year after that time. 
The Court's finding in paragraph 36 thatM. . . the house and property belonged to Mr. 
Bradford . . ." is not consistent with the evidence nor case law. Although Mr. Bradford owned 
the property prior to the parties' marriage, he chose to give half of it to Mrs. Bradford after they 
had been married several years because he cared for her, wanted to take care of her and because 
he loved her. He intended to give her the property and it was his intent that she own one-half 
of it. This gifting of one-half of the property changed the nature of the property from solely 
owned pre-marital property to jointly held marital property as set forth in Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). In that case, the Court ruled that property acquired by 
gift or inheritance by one spouse should be awarded to that spouse on divorce unless the 
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acquiring spouse places title in their joint names in such a manner as to evidence and intent to 
make it marital property, (id) That is the very situation in the present case. Mr. Bradford 
obtained the property as a gift from his parents, but deeded it in joint tenancy to Mrs. Bradford 
with the intent to give her half because he cared for her, loved her, wanted to take care of her 
and wanted her to have one-half of the property. The case of Jesperson v. Jesperson cited in 
paragraph 36 of the Court's Findings should be distinguished as not applicable to the present case 
because in that case the Court found M. . . there was no intention by plaintiff to create a one-half 
property interest in defendant, nor any expectation by defendant that he had received a one-half 
property interest." (Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). The case of 
(Georgedes) cited by the Court in paragraph 36 should also be distinguished. In that case the 
Court considered the marriage of fairly short duration whereas in this case the marriage is of 
almost thirteen years. In addition, the Court also weighed in connection with the property 
settlement the fact that the party receiving the property was also being burdened with all of the 
outstanding debts and that any increase in the value of the property was offset by the marital debt 
that was being taken on. Finally, Georgedes was decided several years prior to Mortensen v. 
Mortensen and makes no mention of the Court's rule in Mortensen regarding the gifted property. 
The Court should amend paragraph 3 of the Conclusions of Law to reflect that Mr. 
Bradford was not a creditor of Mrs. Bradford's because Mr. Bradford's claim to the real property 
is not based on any legal right and Mrs. Bradford's knowledge of any such claim at the time of 
her conveyance to her son would have been purely speculative. 
The Court should amend paragraph 6 of its Conclusions of Law to reflect that the 
conveyance from Mrs. Bradford to Mr. DeMita was not a fraudulent transfer. 
The Court should amend paragraph 7 of the Conclusions of Law so as to remove the same 
and not set aside the transfer from Mrs. Bradford to Mr. DeMita as no fraudulent conveyance 
occurred. 
The Court should amend paragraph 8 of the Conclusions of Law to be reflective of the 
amended Findings of Fact set forth above by defendants. 
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In the alternative, if the Court continues to conclude that there was a fraudulent 
conveyance, it should conclude that the parties own the real property jointly, that the property 
should be sold and the equity divided equally between them as each of them needs the funds 
therefrom to maintain a place of abode and that the property cannot be equitably divided without 
sale. 
Defendant, Andrea Bradford, should be restored to her former name of Andrea DeMita. 
Finally, the Court should amend and alter paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Decree of 
Divorce to be consistent with the amendments and alterations to the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and to reflect that either Mr. Bradford owns a one-half interest in the 
subject real property or that Mrs. Bradford owns a one-half interest in the subject property and 
to require the property to be sold and the proceeds divided between Mr. Bradford and whichever 
of the defendants the Court deems to own the other half. 
The Court has broad discretion in dividing the parties' property at the time of a divorce 
regardless of its source or time of acquisition. In the exercise of discretion, trial courts need to 
be guided by the general purpose to be achieved by a property division, which is to allocate the 
property in a manner which best serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue 
their separate lives. Read v. ReadT 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979). The Court's present Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree work an entirely and equitable outcome. The parties 
were married more than twelve years and are now into or close to their retirement from gainful 
employment. It is inequitable and does not serve the best interest of the parties to go forward 
in their lives to deprive Mrs. Bradford of any and all value in the real property that she was 
given by Mr. Bradford and which she believes she owned for more than seven years. The facts 
of the case, the law applicable to this case, and equity all require that the Court amend and alter 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the Decree as set forth herein and defendants' 
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respectfully pray that the same be done. 
DATED this^rnhday of July, 1998. 
Howard Chuntz 
Attorney for Defendants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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The Court having reviewed defendants' Motion to Alter and Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and finding that the Court's original Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law issued by Judge Hansen are appropriate, therefore, denies defendants' 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on March 4, 1998) 
3 (Direct examination of Mrs. Bradford by Mr. Patton in 
4 progress. Certain portions extracted) 
5 Q. BY MR. PATTON: Do you think that those 
6 things are worth more than $500 if you added them all 
7 together? 
8 A. I don't know the market value that people 
9 would buy -- what they would pay for it. I don't know 
10 how much people would pay me for those. 
11 Q. Would it be worth more than a thousand? 
12 A. It would be worth more to me because to 
13 replace it I would have to pay more. 
14 Q. Can you tell the Court what you own right 
15 now that's worth more than $300, any item of property 
16 that you own that is worth more than $3 00? 
17 A. A stereo, stereo console. 
18 THE COURT: What console? 
19 THE WITNESS: A stereo console. It's an 
20 old -- I don't know how you say it -- a console. 
21 THE COURT: For a stereo? 
22 THE WITNESS: Console. 
23 Q. BY MR. PATTON: Do you remember when I took 
24 your deposition last year? 
25 A. Yes. 
1 Q. You indicated that you own two dressers; is 
2 that correct? 
3 A. Yes, that's correct. 
4 Q. And you also owned a wooden kitchen table 
5 and six chairs; is that right? 
6 A. Yes, that's right. 
7 Q. And then you also had personal pictures and 
8 family genealogy? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And those items--
11 A. And a bed. 
12 Q. And a bed. And that if they were all added 
13 together, and you had to sell them at a yard sale or 
14 sell them as used furniture, could you get more than a 
15 thousand dollars for them? 
16 A. Antiques, like -- I don't know. 
17 Q. You don't know? 
18 A. I don't know what people pay. 
19 Q. Do you remember signing a quit claim deed to 
20 Mr. Demita? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And that was for half of the property that 
23 Mr. Bradford owned prior to the marriage; is that 
24 correct? 
25 A. What I owned --my half what I owned is what 
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I quit claimed. 
Q. You quit claimed to Mr. Demita? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you do that? 
A. When did I do that? 
Q. Yes. 
A. August 8th, 1996. 
Q. I'm going to show you what's been marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 for identification and ask 
if you recognize that document. Is that a copy of the 
quit claim you signed to Mr. Demita? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And when you are looking at that quit claim 
deed, whose handwriting is printed in there word, 
"Andrea Bradford, Spanish Fork, James Demita," whose 
handwriting is that? 
A. That's James Demita's handwriting. I asked 
him to make up the form for me. 
Q. And then you signed the quit claim deed? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And it was notarized? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was by Lorea Galloway? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And whose office did you go to so that could 
6 
be notarized? 
A. It wasn't an office, I went to a bank. 
Q. You went to a bank and had it notarized? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Prior to signing that quit claim deed did 
you talk to my client about it? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you tell him you were going to do it? 
A. No. 
Q. After you did it did you tell him you had 
signed that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You did tell him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you tell him you had done it? 
A. In order to get the right date it was one of 
the only times that Phyllis Penner came into our 
kitchen -- so she might remember the date -- and 
Phyllis and George were in the kitchen with me, and I 
told George and Phyllis both that they didn't need to 
worry about their concerns they had about if I died 
first that his children wouldn't get any of the 
property. So I told them that I took care of it to 
make sure, and I ensured that -- I promised you that 
you will get half of the property because I took care 
7 
of it so that it will be that way. 
MR. PATTON: May I approach the witness, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, we would submit 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 for identification as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. 
THE COURT: Okay, you're offering it into 
evidence. Any objection? 
MR. CHUNTZ: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Number l will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 1 received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: When I took your deposition 
I asked you if you owed Mr. Demita any money when you 
signed that quit claim deed, and in fact you didn't 
owe him any money when you signed that, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. And when I asked you why you signed it you 
said it was simply estate planning. Is that why you 
signed that deed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you sign a will? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you go see an attorney? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Who did you go see? 
A. Howard Chuntz. 
Q. And you went to his office and met with him 
prior to signing the quit claim deed? 
A. I can't remember if it was on the telephone 
or in his office, but I remember he told me I had two 
options, that I could either -- I wasn't knowledgeable 
about how to take care of my -- what I owned in case I 
died, and so I asked him what I -- how I should ensure 
that my child will get what I have -- what I own when 
I die. He said I have two options, I could either 
quit claim it or I could put it in some kind of a 
trust -- family fund or something like that, and he 
said the second option will cost you money to do that, 
and the first -- quit claim won't cost you any money, 
and I said, "Well, I'll--" so I decided I wanted to do 
it the quit claim way. 
Q. When I took your deposition last year you 
indicated that you believed you had talked to him by 
phone; isn't that correct? 
A. Say that again. 
Q. Last year when I took your deposition you 
believed that you had talked to Mr. Chuntz by phone 
and received that advice; isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And you still believe you talked to him by 
phone, don't you ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was Mr. Demita who actually went to his 
office and met with him; isn't that true? 
A. No, he was the one that was talking on the 
phone with me. 
Q. So it was Mr. Demita who called Mr. Chuntz? 
A. I don't know who dialed the number, but it 
was -- I needed some attorney and I didn't ever have 
an attorney in my life so I asked my son which 
attorney I could find this information from, and he 
suggested Howard Chuntz. 
Q. And when you signed the quit claim deed I 
asked you if you believed the home was worth --or the 
property was worth $190,000, and your answer was yes, 
wasn't it? 
A. Say that again. 
Q. The home and the land that you quit claim 
deeded to Mr. Demita, if it hadn't been divided I 
asked you if you believed it was worth $190,000, and 
you said yes, you believed that, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you still believe that? 
A. That is what the county had when they sent 
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our tax notice. 
Q. And you received from Mr. Demita for your 
one-half interest $10; is that correct? 
A. Not correct. 
Q* Did he give you any money? 
A. He gave me labor, which would amount to more 
than enough. 
Q. So when you say you gave it to him for an 
estate plan, you're now saying it wasn't an estate 
plan, you sold him your property? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Objection, your Honor, she 
hasn't said it wasn't for estate planning. He's 
mischaracterizing the witness' statement. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. 
have, ma' 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
deed? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
BY MR. PATTON: How many children do you 
am? 
Five. 
Are they all still alive? 
Yes. 
Are all of their names on that quit claim 
No. 
Just Mr. Demita's? 
Yes. 
And you did that for estate planning 
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purposes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you intend -- did you intend to 
continue living in the home? When you signed the deed 
did you plan to continue living in the home? 
A. Actually I didn't have any plans. 
Q. You had no plans? 
A. No plans. 
Q. Did you continue to live in the home? 
A. I did, but--
Q. Did you believe that Mr. Demita was going to 
force you to not live in the home? Did you expect he 
was going to force you out of the home? 
A. Again, I never had any thoughts about 
anything like that. 
Q. When did you intend for him to actually own 
the half-interest in the home? Was it when you died 
or was it when you gave him the deed? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Objection, your Honor, that 
calls for a legal conclusion, the deed and delivery of 
the deed created ownership, occupancy has nothing to 
do with that. I think the questions are confusing to 
the witness. 
THE COURT: He's not asking for a legal 
conclusion, he wants to know what her intent was, 
1 overruled. 
2 MR. CHUNTZ: Maybe he could rephrase it in a 
3 way that doesn't--
4 THE COURT: Go ahead and rephrase it. 
5 MR. PATTON: And I'll do that, your Honor. 
6 Q- BY MR. PATTON: I'm not trying to trick you, 
7 ma'am. I'm trying to figure out this: did you plan 
8 that he would immediately own half the home when you 
9 gave him the deed, or did you plan that he got it when 
10 you died? Do you understand the difference? 
11 A. Okay, say that slower. 
12 Q. Did you plan that he would get the home when 
13 you deeded it to him? In other words when you signed 
14 the deed that, "I'm giving you half my home now," or 
15 did you plan that he wouldn't actually get that until 
16 you died? 
17 MR. CHUNTZ: Your Honor, objection again. 
18 That goes to the question of ownership as opposed to 
19 the question of occupancy. I think the witness could 
20 be confused as to whether her leaving the home had to 
21 do with ownership or not. I mean these are legal 
22 technicalities that we understand but lay men don't 
23 particularly understand. 
24 THE COURT: Well, I think you can follow up 
25 with your own questions to her to help her understand. 
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I think Mr. Patton's question is appropriate, it only 
goes to what she--
MR. PATT0N: May I approach the witness, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: --her intent. 
MR. PATT0N: May I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Mrs. Bradford, I'm going to 
show you some questions that I asked you last year at 
the deposition. My question was, "When did you intend 
for him to get it?" And your answer was? 
A. "The date that I signed it over to him." 
Q. And then my question was, "So you intended 
it to be his at that time?" And what was your answer? 
A. "Yes." 
Q. And then my question was, "But you continued 
to live in the home?" And what was your answer? 
A. "And why not?" 
Q. And then you said, "Why not?" And then I 
pressed you further, I asked the question again, "You 
continued to live in the home, yes or no?" And what 
was your answer? 
A. "Yes." 
Q. And you still live in the home? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. So even though you gave him the deed, you 
lived in the home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you used it as your primary residence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I asked you -- may I approach the 
witness again? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: My question was, "Did you 
tell my client, Mr. Bradford, that you had signed that 
quit claim deed?" And what was your answer? 
A. "I had no reason to." 
Q. Do you remember having an argument with my 
client in July of 1996? 
A. (No response) 
Q. Do you remember some engineers coming to the 
home? 
A. Can I answer your first question? 
Q. You bet. 
A. I can remember having arguments with your 
client continuously through our marriage. 
Q. Do you remember a specific argument that 
happened in July of 1996 when there were some 
engineers in the home? Do you remember that day? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And did you and he have an argument? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was he complaining that he didn't want 
the home condemned? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he was also complaining that he didn't 
like Mr. Demita living there for nothing, without 
paying; isn't that true? 
A, That's what he claimed, but that wasn't 
true, that he was living for nothing. 
Q. When you signed this quit claim deed to Mr. 
Demita August 8th, within a month of the argument that 
takes place in July -- you acknowledge you had that 
argument, right ? 
A. In July we had an argument. 
Q. You signed the quit claim in August, right? 
When you signed that quit claim deed to Mr. Demita, 
did you have any side agreements with him concerning 
that quit claim deed? In other words, he's going to 
give it back to you or anything like that? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have an agreement that he would 
continue to allow you to live there? 
A. We didn't discuss anything at all. I was 
just doing what I wanted to do. 
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Q. So you didn't have a discussion about it? 
A. No, that I remember. 
Q. When you deeded that property away to Mr. 
Detnita, the property that you kept in your possession, 
was it worth $40,000 or $50,000? In other words, your 
furniture, your car, everything else you owned, was it 
worth $40,000? 
A. You mean if I sold it? 
Q. Right. May I approach again, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: I took your deposition last 
year, and my question was, "The real property that you 
deeded away, did you own any other assets that were 
worth $40,000 or $50,000?" And what was your answer? 
A. "No." 
Q. And my question was, "Did you own any other 
assets that were worth $85,000 or $90,000?" And what 
was your answer? 
A. "No." 
Q. And you don't own any property now that is 
worth $40,000 or $50,000, do you? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you remember filing an affidavit in this 
matter for an order to show cause? 
A. What do you mean? 
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Q. A document called an affidavit. 
A. That I signed? 
Q. Yes. Do you remember signing one? 
A. About what? 
MR. PATTON: May I approach the witness, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Let me show you what's been 
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 for identification. 
It's entitled, "Affidavit of Andrea Bradford," and it 
purports to have been signed by Andrea Bradford. Do 
you recognize that document? 
A. Yes, that's -- you're right. 
Q. I want you to continue looking at that. The 
first paragraph says that you're the defendant in the 
action, that just labels who you are; is that right? 
A. Right. 
Q. And then it indicates that you received a 
one-half joint tenancy interest in 1989, that's 
paragraph 2, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you state that during your 12 years 
of marriage you've helped to maintain the property, 
care for it and improve it. 
A. Yes. 
1 Q. What improvements did you make to the 
2 property during the 12 years of the marriage, ma'am? 
3 A. When I say improve it, does that mean that I 
4 have to -- are you saying that it was from my own 
5 personal money or from our marital money that I made 
6 the improvements? 
7 Q. Ma'am, I didn't write the affidavit, I'm 
8 asking you what you meant. Do you know what you 
9 meant ? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. What did you mean? 
12 THE COURT: Which paragraph are you 
13 referring to? 
14 MR. PATTON: May I approach, your Honor? I 
15 can give you a copy of the affidavit, if you want it. 
16 THE COURT: I think I have it, let's just 
17 make sure it's the right one. 
18 MR. PATTON: I'm referring to paragraph 3 of 
19 her affidavit. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 THE WITNESS: You want -- okay--
22 Q. BY MR. PATTON: Let me ask you this, did you 
23 build on any rooms on the home? 
24 A. No, but more important, I built -- I had 
25 installed the basic utilities that we needed that 
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weren't there when I moved in. 
Q. What basic utilities were those? 
A. I don't have the drain field with me here, 
but I have the others with me, the documents what I 
improved on. 
Q. And I'm just asking what improvements did 
you make? I'm not asking to see the documents, I just 
want to know what--
A. I called up -- this was one of our very 
first arguments. 
Q. Stop there. I don't want an explanation. 
A. Okay, because you said--
Q. Did you build on a room? Let me ask you 
that, did you build a room or make any additions to 
the home? 
A. Yes, I made additions to the home. 
Q. Just tell me what the exact additions --
just list what the additions were. 
A. One was a sewer so we could use the septic 
tank -- sewage system. I had to order a new drain 
field. 
Q. So you improved the septic system? 
A. No, there was no septic system there when I 
moved in. The black sludge was coming up into the 
home in the basement where I had to take a shower, and 
1 there was no plumbing sewage place, there was nothing 
2 there for a sewage to go to, it was plugged with a 
3 piece of wood, so I had to keep unplugging the piece 
4 of wood to use the shower that I had to have to take a 
5 shower, and then plug the piece back in. 
6 Q. Ma'am, I know you want to tell your story, 
7 and your counsel can let you do that. I just asked --
8 let me ask you this. Was there indoor plumbing when 
9 you moved into the home? 
10 A. Not up to city code, no. 
11 Q. But there was indoor plumbing? 
12 A. Very poor. 
13 Q. Just yes or no. 
14 A. There was some plumbing, I'll say, some. 
15 Q. And so when you say that the addition was 
16 made, what you did was you improved the plumbing? 
17 A. Yes. And then another thing I improved, I 
18 improved was there was also -- I ordered a -- the 
19 chimney hadn't been cleaned for long years -- many 
20 years, so I improved to have the chimney cleaned, but 
21 the furnace man said to have the coal furnace cleaned 
22 so that --to eliminate all of the coal smoke that was 
23 coming throughout the house constantly, so when I had 
24 it cleaned the furnace man said the coal furnace was 
25 so defective that the tears -- I think that's the 
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word -- were all — 
Q. Did you add a furnace, is that what — 
A. So I ordered a new furnace and changed it 
from coal to gas furnace. 
Q. So you ordered a new furnace and you 
improved the septic system? 
A. And also the well, the drinking water, and 
the water I used for brushing my teeth and the shower 
was contaminated, so I had to have it tested at the — 
by the State, and I have a thing here to— 
Q. Did you dig a new well? 
A. No, we didn't. Our bishop asked George 
to — more or less told George to get on the city 
water right now. 
Q. So did you get on city water? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now besides improving the septic system, 
changing the furnace and changing to city water, did 
you make any improvements to the property or any 
additions? 
A. What would entail improvements? 
Q. Well, I don't know, that's why I asked you. 
You said you made improvements and I asked you what 
they were. Now you've listed three. 
A. In the back, out in the back where the farm 
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is I did a lot of cleaning up to improve the 
sanitation and the health and life risks that were 
there. 
Q. So you also cleaned up around the home? 
A. In the home and in the back of the whole 
property. 
Q. What else did you do? 
A. I did so much I don't think I'd ever be able 
to tell you here. 
Q. Well, I'm just asking you what your 
improvements were. Are those the big items that you 
did? 
A. Those are the main ones, but there are many, 
many smaller ones that were equally as threatening to 
my health and my life. 
Q. So those were day-to-day maintenance items; 
is that right? The other items were more day-to-
day -- they weren't a big project, but you would work 
on a regular basis; is that what you're saying? 
A. Now what did you say? 
Q. You've listed the main items that you 
improved; is that correct, the ones you've listed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you state that there were other 
things that you did, right? 
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A. Yes, many. 
Q. But those were more on a day-to-day basis 
and not a big project like improving the sewer or 
changing the plumbing. We're talking day-to-day go 
out and haul trash away, clean things up and make it 
more presentable; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you say that you maintained the 
property, that's what you're saying when you 
maintained it and cared for it; isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You also indicate in paragraph 6, it says, 
"My conveyance of my interest in this subject real 
property did not and has not made me insolvent." 
Isn't that what you said? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you mean? 
A. Well, I asked you what insolvent meant 
because I'm not that--
Q. And I'm asking you what you meant when you 
filed the affidavit. 
A. I thought it meant that I would be 
destitute, or something like that, I don't know, and I 
never lacked for anything, even with my conveyance, I 
know I would not lack. 
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Q. And the reason you didn't lack is because 
you were married to Mr. Bradford who supported you; 
isn't that true? 
A. That's kind of questionable. 
Q. Are you saying you can support yourself? 
A. I never felt that I was supported. 
Q. Are you saying you can support yourself if 
you're divorced, that you don't need money from Mr. 
Bradford? 
A. I don't know the future because I can't 
foresee what I might -- I'm 65, I don't know if I'll 
be -- my health might deteriorate or whatever, I can't 
foresee the future. 
Q. The fact of the matter is, ma'am, when you 
signed that affidavit saying that you weren't 
insolvent, you didn't know what the word "insolvent" 
meant, did you? 
A. I thought it meant being without, I think, 
without anything. 
MR. PATTON: I have no further questions of 
this witness. 
THE COURT: Let's take a five minute break. 
We'll be in recess for five minutes. 
(Short recess) 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: When I took your deposition 
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last year, I asked you this question: "Did you owe 
Mr. Demita -- when you signed this quit claim deed to 
Mr. Demita, did you owe him any money?ff And what was 
your answer? 
A. "No." 
Q. And I said, "Okay, can you tell me why you 
signed the quit claim deed to Mr. Demita?" And your 
answer was, "Sure." And then I said, "Why did you 
sign it?" And what was your answer? 
A. "It was simply estate planning." 
Q. And you didn't owe him any money when you 
signed it, did you? 
A. No. 
MR. PATTON: Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHUNTZ: 
Q. Mr. Patton was asking you about improvements 
that you made to the property, or that were made to 
the property during the 12 plus years that you've 
lived there. Was anything done to the roof? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was done to the roof? 
A. The whole entire roof was shingled. 
Q. Was there any painting done to the property? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. What was painted, inside or out? 
A. Inside and -- the house is brick, so all the 
trim was painted, and the porch railings, and inside 
rooms have been painted because I asked my son to help 
me paint. 
Q. Now Mr. Patton was asking you some questions 
about insolvency. At the time in August of 1996 when 
you deeded the property to your son, did you owe 
anybody any money at that time? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have any bills that were 
outstanding? 
A. No. 
Q. And you were able to pay for your living 
expenses between what you got from Social Security and 
what Mr. Bradford provided? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Patton asked you about a time in July 
when Mr. Bradford came home and there were some 
engineers at the house. Were the engineers at the 
house concerning condemning the house? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there any discussion at all at that time 
or at any time about tearing the house down? 
A. No. 
1 Q. Were you and Mr. Bradford planning and 
2 working on developing the property? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. You were planning on selling it? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Could the property have been developed 
7 without tearing down the home? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. When Mr. Patton was asking you about this 
10 July argument, you had wanted to tell the Court 
11 something about this argument or arguments. Why don't 
12 you tell the Court about arguments with George. Did 
13 George and you have arguments often or not? 
14 A. Yes, very often. 
15 Q. About how often would you say that you and 
16 George had arguments? 
17 A. Out of a month's time, you mean? 
18 Q. Okay, out of a month's time. 
19 A. Every three days and more. 
20 Q. Did George ever talk about divorce during 
21 these arguments? 
22 A. He always threatened me with divorce if he 
23 didn't like the decisions I made for the property --
24 of repairing and any -- even the little things in the 
25 kitchen, if I threw kitchen garbage in the garbage and 
1 if I wanted to have a place to dump ray garbage, he 
2 always went into ranting and raving and rages --
3 violent rages to me all the time. 
4 Q. Did he raise the issue of divorce during 
5 these times? 
6 A. Yes, every time he threatened me with 
7 divorce when I wouldn't agree with the way he wanted 
8 things done. 
9 Q. So divorce was a regular and common subject 
10 in your household? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And what was your reaction to these threats 
13 of divorce? 
14 A. At first I was frightened, but he always 
15 ended up saying that he was sorry after, and he would 
16 always apologize and be -- lived like civil together, 
17 and so I never paid much attention after that because 
18 he was always threatening me and then never doing 
19 anything, so I just assumed that we never would ever 
20 be divorced. 
21 Q. Did you take his threats of divorce 
22 seriously? 
23 A. Never after so many times, no. 
24 Q. Did you make plans or take actions on the 
25 basis that when he told you he was going to divorce 
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you that you better do something about that? 
A. No. 
Q. This argument that Mr. Patton refers to that 
occurred in July of 1996, did George threaten to 
divorce you at that argument? 
A. Yes, he was constantly threatening me around 
that time. 
Q. And did things get resolved between you and 
he after that argument? 
A. Yes, we still--
Q. Did he go back to being civil? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Between that July argument and when you 
deeded the property -- quit claimed the property to 
your son in August, was he still threatening to 
divorce you during this time? 
A. (No response) 
Q. Let me ask you a different question. Were 
you and Mr. Bradford continuing to attempt to develop 
the property after the July argument? 
A. Yes, we were always doing that. 
Q. And between this July argument and the day 
you deeded the property to your son, did Mr. Bradford 
tell you again that he was going to divorce you? 
A. What was that again? 
1 Q. After the July argument, between that time 
2 and when you deeded you property in August to James, 
3 did Mr. Bradford, while you were continuing to try to 
4 develop the property, did he threaten to divorce you 
5 again? 
6 A. During the time we were developing he never 
7 ever mentioned divorce then. 
8 Q. Well, he mentioned it at this argument in 
9 July when you were developing it. 
10 A. Right, just because he was mad for that one 
11 day, yeah. 
12 Q. And then he let it go? 
13 A. Yes, because then it was just the same 
14 pattern, he just said he was sorry and apologized and 
15 then afterwards keep on talking about developing. 
16 Q. So when you deeded your property to James in 
17 August, you didn't do it because you were concerned 
18 about George's divorcing you? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. You did it because you wanted to take care 
21 of the problem of if you died before George, George 
22 would get all of the property and your children would 
23 get nothing? 
24 A. Right. 
25 Q. Now there's been some suggestion that you 
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didn't do this deed to James for estate planning 
because you only gave the property to James and not to 
your other children. Why didn't you deed the property 
to your other children's names? 
A. Because my other four children are in 
another age bracket, they're ten years way over James, 
and they've already established themselves well in 
life, and they all own their own -- have their own 
home, and I wanted before I died to make sure that all 
my children had a home. 
MR. CHUNTZ: Thank you. 
MR. PATTON: First your Honor, let me submit 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 for identification as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2. It's her affidavit. 
MR. CHUNTZ: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Number 2 will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence) 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PATTON: 
Q. First I want to make it clear in my mind, 
when you say you deeded to James Demita, you intended 
for him to get the entire thing. 
A. What entire thing? 
Q. Your half interest in that home. Isn't that 
right, just--
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A. Just whatever I owned, yes. 
Q. And so you didn't intend for your other 
children to get any of it? 
A. I know my children, and I know that if any 
of my any other children were in need that James would 
help them and give them whatever they needed. I know 
that. 
Q. But when you signed the quit claim deed it 
wasn't your intent that they each get the same amount, 
it was that it all go to him; is that what your 
testimony just was? 
A. Yes, because I know he would do the right 
thing with it. 
MR. PATTON: May I approach the witness, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: At the deposition I asked 
you this question: "Is there a reason you didn't quit 
claim to all of them?" And what was your answer? 
A. "Just to simplify it," like I said. 
Q. And then you went on, what did--
A. "I knew James would do the right thing and 
share and share alike." 
Q. And then my next question was, "Did you give 
him instructions to do that?" And what was your 
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answer? 
A. "I didn't need to. He told me that's what 
he would do." 
Q. So he told you he would share equally with 
| his brothers and sisters? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
line of 
Only if there was a need. 
Only if there was a need? 
But I didn't add that on there. That was--
MR. CHUNTZ: I'm going to object to this 
questioning, your Honor, I don't think it goes 
to anything that's relevant. 
MR. PATTON: They opened the door. 
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. 
MR. PATTON: No further questions. 
MR. CHUNTZ: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
(Court handles another matter) 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, I would call George 
Bradford to the stand. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this case now 
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
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GEORGE BRADFORD 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PATTON: 
Q. Mr. Bradford, I'm going to show you some 
documents that I've marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 
for identification. It's just a packet of documents. 
THE COURT: Is this a courtesy copy? 
MR. PATTON: That's correct. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Mr. Bradford, will you 
please state your name for the record, please? 
A. George Roy Bradford. 
Q. Mr. Bradford, are you familiar with the 
property that we've been talking about here today, 
this home and land? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How are you familiar with it? 
A. That's where I was born and raised. 
Q. When you say were you born and raised there, 
what do you mean you were born and raised there? Were 
you actually born on that property? 
A. No, I was born in the old house that my 
father sold and moved up town. 
Q. Did that home used to be part of this 
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property? 
A. No. Yes, excuse me. 
Q. And the land that we're talking about, it's 
a home and how many acres? 
A. There's only 20 acres all together. 
Q. And the first Bradford that owned that home 
and acreage, who was that? 
A. Pleasant Sprague Bradford. 
Q. And who was that in relationship to you? 
A. My father's dad, my grandpa. 
Q. So your grandpa owned it originally? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then who owned it after him? 
A. My father, Roy Bradford. 
Q. And? 
A. Minnie Williams Bradford. 
Q. And then who owned it after them? 
A. I did. 
Q. And when did you get it? Did you get it 
before or after you married Andrea? 
A. It was before. 
Q. And when you married Andrea did you owe any 
money on that property? 
A. No. 
Q. I see you looking and thinking hard. Do you 
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have some trouble with your thought process on 
occasion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Sometimes my mind goes almost blank, I 
can't--
Q. Did you ever have any accidents that has 
complicated this? 
A. When I was three I was kicked in the head by 
a horse -- a colt, it wasn't a horse, and it seemed to 
slow my thinking a lot. 
Q. Can you tell the Court how much education 
you have? 
A. Well, I graduated from high school, 12 
years, and then I have -- after they closed the 
foundry down at Geneva they told us that we had an 
option of we could go take a class in UVSC in several 
different areas, auto repair or maintenance or 
mechanic. 
Q. So did you get that education? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many additional years? 
A. I started in 1985 and it was a two year 
course. 
Q. Do you remember marrying Andrea in 1985? 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Were you still working at Geneva when you 
3 married her? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And how long had you worked at Geneva? 
6 A. Total? 
7 Q. Yes. 
8 A. Twenty-two years something. 
9 Q. And so when you were with Andrea working at 
10 Geneva, when did you retire from Geneva? 
11 A. I believe it was 1986 that they ordered us 
12 off the property. 
13 THE COURT: Just a minute, let me make sure 
14 I'm clear. What did he start in 1985? You said he 
15 started in 1985. 
16 MR. PATTON: He married in 1985. 
17 THE COURT: I got that. 
18 MR. PATTON: And he started an educational 
19 program in 1985. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you. 
21 Q. BY MR. PATTON: You worked at Geneva a total 
22 of 22 years? 
23 A. And so many months, yes. 
24 Q. And you married Andrea in 1985? 
25 A. Yes. 
1 Q. And then you worked at Geneva another year 
2 before--
3 A. No -- well, it was close to a year because 
4 1986, I believe, was when they ordered us off the 
5 place. 
6 Q. So it was about a year. So out of the 22 
7 years that you worked there you were married to Andrea 
8 one year? 
9 A. Yeah. 
10 Q. I'm going to ask you to look at the very 
11 first document on top that you've got there. It's a 
12 document entitled, "Order of Dismissal," and it 
13 purports to be a divorce action George Bradford and 
14 Andrea Bradford, just the very first page, don't turn 
15 back, very first page. Do you remember filing a 
16 divorce action against Andrea in 1992? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And that was--
19 A. Okay. 
20 Q. And that was dismissed in 1993 in February; 
21 is that right? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. And you and Andrea decided to try and make 
24 your marriage work; is that right? 
25 A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you continue to have arguments and 
discussions about divorce? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you continue to have arguments and 
discussions about divorce up until the time you filed 
this divorce action? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember an argument that you had 
with Andrea in July of 1996? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was that at your home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it like all of the other arguments or 
was it smaller or was it bigger? 
A. It was bigger. 
Q. Why was it bigger? 
A. Because I had a feeling that those engineers 
were down there for a purpose, and--
Q. For what purpose did you think they were 
there for? 
A. To condemn the place. 
Q. And when you argued with Andrea that day, 
how long did that argument last? 
A. Well, I worked at the school, and I don't 
get off until about 4 -- it must have been off and on 
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the rest of the day. 
Q. Did you hear Andrea say that that argument 
sort of slopped over --in other words, it was around 
that time --in other words it wasn't just that day, 
but it was actually around that time. Do you recall 
that happening? 
A. Yes, around that day? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you argue about anything other than just 
the fact that the people were there, or did you argue 
about anything else, too? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you argue about Mr. Demita? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was that argument about? 
A. That he wasn't living up to the verbal 
agreement that we made, and that he -- I wanted him 
out of there. 
Q. You wanted him out of where? 
A. Out of the place, out of the home because of 
his long stay, that he had already been there. 
Q. And what verbal agreement wasn't he living 
up to? 
A. We made a verbal agreement that he would pay 
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all the utility bills and he never did, he only paid 
for the first three months, and then after that I paid 
them. 
Q. When was that agreement made? 
A. In December of 1985. 
Q. In December of 1985? 
A. I mean December of 1995, excuse me. 
Q. So he moved in in December of 1995? 
A. No, he lived there in -- he moved in 
December of 1995. 
Q. Did he bring anyone with him? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he have his son with him? 
A. No. 
Q. But did he have an agreement to pay 
utilities? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many months did he pay utilities? 
A. Three months. 
Q. And then what happened? 
A. And then I paid them from then on. 
Q. Did there come a time that his son started 
living with you, too? 
A. Well, after he was born, yes. 
Q. When was that? 
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A. Well, he's 11 now, so it's been 11 years 
ago. 
Q. Now in the July argument it's your testimony 
that you told your wife you wanted Mr. Demita out of 
that house? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you and your wife and Mr. Demita, had 
you guys talked about trying to develop the property 
part of that? 
A. What day are we using? 
Q. July of 1996 when you have the fight, prior 
to July of 1996 -- when the engineers w ere there, 
prior to that date had you and she and Mr. Demita 
talked about developing that property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you talked about selling the home or 
bulldozing the house down? 
A. No. 
Q. What was the agreement in terms of 
developing the house? 
A. Well, it started out with two other 
developers that were interested in it, and it fell 
through, so James claimed he could do it himself, so I 
wanted to have it developed. I accepted until I found 
out later that none of the stuff that he was telling 
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> it -- the 
in the back 
and that 
code of the city 
required you to have 160 some-odd feet to get to the 
property, and there wasn't--
Q. You say 160-odd feet, is that 160-odd feet 
on a city road? 
A. Yes, for a city road, a double lane road 
going down. 
Q. And was there 160 some-odd feet? 
A. No, sir, there wasn't. 
Q. Was there 160 some-odd feet if the house was 
taken down? 
A. Yes. No, no, excuse me, there wasn't 
because -- I'm not sure of the width of the place, I 
think it's 13 0 some-odd feet. 
Q. Did you ever agree that the house would be 
taken down? 
A. No. 
(Direct testimony of Mr. Bradford by Mr. Patton 
continues. Certain portions extracted) 
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Q. BY MR. PATTON: Other than the thousand 
dollars you took out and $700 you took out, since this 
divorce has been pending have you taken any other 
money out of your savings or IRA, that you're aware 
of? 
A. No. 
Q. Not that you're aware of? 
A. Not that I'm aware of, no. 
Q. Have you made additional contributions to 
it? Do you put money in each month? 
A. No, I just barely have enough to pay the 
bills, utility bills. 
Q. The next document claims it's a warranty 
deed. 
A. Yes. 
Q. It says it's a warranty deed and it's dated 
November 1989, and it purports to be a deed 
transferring property to you and Andrea as husband and 
wife with full rights of survivorship and not as 
tenants in common. Is that the deed that you signed 
that transferred the property to you and Andrea? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then the next page is a document 
entitled, "Quit Claim Deed," and that's the document 
that purports that Andrea transferred it to Mr. 
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Demita. Were you aware that she had done that? 
A. No, sir, I wasn't. 
Q. How did you become aware of the fact that 
she had done that? 
A. Through my daughter. 
Q. How did your daughter tell you? 
A. My lawyer asked for a copy of the deed, and 
my daughter went to the courthouse to get it and then 
she found out that this had been done. 
Q. When you say the deed, you didn't mean the 
quit claim deed, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. You mean the deed transferring it to you and 
Andrea? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you weren't aware that there had even 
been a quit claim deed? 
A. No. 
Q. And when did you find out there had been a 
quit claim deed? 
A. When my daughter, Phyllis, told me. 
Q. Do you know about what year that was, was it 
in 1996, was it in 1997? 
A. It happened in 1997. 
Q. Was that at or about the time you filed for 
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divorce, was it about the same time? 
A. Yes, about the same. 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, we would submit 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 for identification as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3. 
MR. CHUNTZ: I have no objection, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Three will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 3 received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Mr. Bradford, did you hear 
the statements that were made by your wife here today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you agree with all those statements? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Do you think she's misrepresented some of 
the facts to the Court? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you were to tell the Court what you 
believe the real problem in your marriage to Mrs. 
Bradford is, what would you be telling him you think 
the real problem in the marriage is? 
A. Having her son living with us and his son. 
Q. Were you residing in Utah County for three 
months immediately prior to the commencement of this 
action? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And were you a resident of Utah County? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in your complaint for divorce you've 
alleged that there are irreconcilable differences 
between you and she; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And are there in fact irreconcilable 
differences? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And are those differences Mr. Demita? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And his continuation in the home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as a result of that are you requesting 
the Court to award you a divorce? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if the Court awards the divorce, are you 
asking the Court to set aside the transfer from your 
wife to Mr. Demita -- set that aside and say it 
belongs to you and she? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then are you asking the Court to award 
the property to you as your premarital property? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. I want to make it clear, and I want to be 
fair to her and I want to be fair to you and I want to 
be fair to the Court -- the improvements, the furnace, 
the sewage system, the painting, the other things that 
she described, where did the money come from that 
those things were paid for? 
A. Out of my pocket. Like I say, I had to use 
up that sub that had collected at Geneva before I was 
eligible -- before I could get any pension from them 
or before I was able to even start the rule of 65, 
that had to be used up first, she told me, the lady 
over at Geneva. 
Q. If the Court orders that we can't set aside 
the deed, are you asking the Court to let you purchase 
Mr. Demita out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you need 90 to 120 days to do that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you understand if the Court does that 
and you can't, that the Court's likely to say that Mr. 
Demita can purchase you out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any reason to disbelieve that 
the home and the property is worth $180,000, less the 
$9,000 to fix the tanks? 
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A. 
Q-
A. 
Q. 
weren't 
A. 
Q. 
going tc 
A. 
Q. 
(No response) 
Remember the appraisals we both--
Yes. 
And both appraisals were for $180,000, 
they? 
Yes. 
And then there's the tank issue and it's 
cost $9,000 to remove them, right? 
Yes. 
If they're removed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you believe they need to be removed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you hear your wife testify that on the 
date she signed that quit claim deed to Mr. Demita she 
didn't owe him any money? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that true? 
A. I don't know about their financial business. 
From all that I know I don't think she owes him any. 
MR. PATTON: Thank you, no further 
questions. 
(Cross examination of Mr. Bradford beginning by Mr. 
Chuntz. Certain portions extracted) 
/// 
1 CROSS EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. CHUNTZ: 
3 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Bradford. 
4 A. Good afternoon. 
5 Q. One little item that you were just 
6 testifying about when Mr. Patton finished with you was 
7 these items that were about your property, the 
8 motorcycle, some tanks, some things like that, that 
9 was all rusted out stuff that you actually helped Mr. 
10 Demita load onto a truck and take down to the scrap 
11 metal place? 
12 A. No, I didn't help him. 
13 Q. You didn't help him with that at all? 
14 A. No, I didn't. I dug that one out of the 
15 river, somebody had hauled it down there to the --
16 dumped some fill in the river, and I had dug it out 
17 there and hauled it up there, and it was clear out of 
18 sight. 
19 Q. But this was all old stuff. 
20 A. Well, does that matter how old it is, it's 
21 still important to me. That's all I wanted was the 
22 frame. 
23 Q. So it wasn't a matter of how much value it 
24 had, it had sentimental value to you? 
25 A. Well, it's just that I was going to use it 
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someday. I had high hopes of using it, not rebuilding 
the cycle, making another thing out of it, and I 
needed the frame to do it. 
Q. Now the tanks that are still buried on the 
property, they're still there now? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you haven't had to remove them anytime 
during the years that you've owned the property; is 
that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
That's right, yes. 
And nobody's told you that you had to remove 
them, have they? 
A. 
Q. 
there's 
A. 
removed. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
As far as you know at this point in time 
no need to remove any of the tanks? 
I guess not if nobody demands that they be 
You got this property from your mom and dad? 
I inherited it, yes. 
When you say you inherited it, they were 
alive when they deeded it to you, weren't they? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
So you got it by deed from them? 
Yes. 
It was a gift? 
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A. 
Q. 
to you • 
A. 
: Q-
A. 
Q. 
to your 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
At the time that they deeded this 
-- do you have brothers and sisters? 
Yes. 
How many? 
I have a brother and two sisters. 
They didn't deed any part of this 
brother and sisters, did they? 
Of the property that I have? 
Uh-huh. 
property 
property 
A. No, but they were questioned about it if 
they wanted it, and they all refused it. 
Q. Your dad, he got the property from--
A. His father, yes, sir, Pleasant Sprague. 
Q. And his father deeded it to him alone, 
didn't he? 
A. From what I know. 
Q. And then later your dad added your mother's 
name after they got married, your dad added your 
mother's name to the property; is that right? 
A. I don't know, I just know her name was on it 
with dad's on the deed. 
Q. But originally it was deeded -- let me show 
you this and ask if you've ever seen this document. 
A. No, I've never. 
1 Q. Is that a deed to the property? 
2 MR. PATTON: Objection, he's indicated he's 
3 never seen it before. I don't think he knows. 
4 THE COURT: Sustained as to the form of the 
5 question. 
6 THE WITNESS: Dora Hansen, that's my 
7 father's mother. 
8 Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: Did she deed that -- does 
9 that deed deal with the property that you presently 
10 own? 
11 A. Let's see--
12 Q. Does that have the same legal description on 
13 it as the property that you presently own? 
14 MR. PATTON: Your Honor, maybe we could 
15 short circuit this. I'm not sure my client would 
16 know. I'm not sure he can read well enough -- if 
17 counsel wants to bring it (inaudible) we might be able 
18 to stipulate. 
19 THE WITNESS: I've never read this before, I 
20 don't know -- it's new to me, no. Does this pertain 
21 to the property where we live? 
22 MR. PATTON: Your Honor, counsel has two 
23 documents, and maybe if he would just proffer what 
24 they are, it might save us some time because I don't 
25 think I'd object to them. We've already agreed that 
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documents like this could come in and we would 
bringing people in to testify, 
client knows. 
THE COURT: 
MR. CHUNTZ 
deeds deal with the 
descriptions are the 
Hansen. 
save 
and I'm not sure my 
State your proffer. 
I have a deed -- all of 
subject farm, the legal 
same. I 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: Was 
have a deed from 
Dora Hansen your 
these 
Dora 
grandmother? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the deed deeds the subject property to 
Roy Bradford, and that's your father, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then subsequently I have a deed from Roy 
Bradford to Roy and Minnie Bradford as joint tenants, 
and Minnie Bradford is your mother? 
A. Yes, sir. 
MR. PATTON: We wouldn't have any dispute 
that those are the documents (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Have them marked and they'll be 
received. 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: You have filed for divorce 
previous to this time against Mrs. Bradford, haven't 
you? 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q-
didn't 
A. 
Yes. 
That was in 1992? 
1992, yes. 
And you were the one that filed? 
Yes. 
And then you had that divorce dismissed, 
you, in February of 1993? 
Yes. 
Q. You've indicated already that you had 
several discussions -- frequently discussed divorcing 
Mrs. Bradford with her over the years that you were 
married; is that true? 
A. Off an on, yes. 
Q. How often did that happen? 
A. Maybe every other month or more often, I 
don't -- I'm not sure. 
Q. Maybe even more often than that? 
A. Yes, on times. 
Q. So divorce was a frequent conversation 
around your home, wasn't it, but you didn't act on it 
very often, did you? 
A. Not until this event took place that really 
stirred me up. 
Q. What stirred you up the first time? Why did 
you file for divorce the first time in 1992? 
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A. 
me. 
Q. 
My wife was stepping out on me. 
MS. BRADFORD: That's his first wife, 
THE WITNESS: In 1992, excuse me. 
BY MR. CHUNTZ: In 1992. Why did you 
for divorce from Andrea in 1992? 
A. 
remember. 
Q. 
A. 
I really don't remember right now. I 
You married Andrea in 1985? 
Yes. 
not 
file 
can't 
Q. And then in 198 9 you gave her the subject 
property in joint tenancy; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You gave that to her as a gift, didn't you? 
You wanted her to have--
MR. PATTON: Objection, that calls for a 
legal conclusion. I think he can ask if he signed it, 
I think he can ask why, but if he wants my client to 
give a legal conclusion, your Honor, I think that 
that's an (inaudible) my client may not understand 
that term. I think he's already explained why he gave 
it to her and why he did it. There's a difference 
between saying that and saying it's a gift. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: You were happy with Andrea 
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in 1989; 
A. 
Q. 
property 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
were you not? 
Yes, 1989, yes. 
At the time when you deeded the real 
over to her--
Half, yes. 
You were happy? 
Yes. 
Did you want to take care of her at that 
time? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
parents 
Yes. 
Did you love her at that time? 
I must have, yes. 
Do you remember at about that time your 
deeding some property over to you and she. 
their property? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
At 245? 
Pardon? 
Their property? 
Their property. 
At 245 South Main? 
I think so.
 { 
Yes. 
And they deeded that over to you and to 
Andrea as joint tenants with rights of survivorship; 
is that correct? 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I don't know how it read, I didn't--
But it was to you and Andrea? 
Yes. Andrea's name was added later, yes. 
And you didn't try to dissuade them from 
doing that? You didn't try to convince them not to 
put her 
A. 
Q. 
name on their property, did you? 
No. 
Because you wanted Andrea to have that as 
well with you? 
! A- No. 
Q. You didn't? 
A. Not necessarily. My father put Andrea's 
name on it. 
Q. Why did he do that? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you try to talk him out of it? 
A. No. 
Q. This was at a time when--
A. Ke had deeded it to me first, and then after 
we were married he added her name onto it, I didn't 
know it. 
Q. You didn't know it? 
A. Until she told me. Then the State took it 
from us because of a shortage of time. 
Q. Let me show you this document, the warranty 
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deed- Is this the property that your mom and dad own 
in Spanish Fork? 
A. At 245, where is that? 
Q. I don't know that there's an address on it. 
A. I guess if it's up in town, nine rods south. 
Q. Did they own any other property in town? 
A. No. 
Q. And this is your mother and father's names? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So they were the owners of the property back 
in March of 1989? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who did they deed this property to? 
A. George Bradford and Andrea Bradford, husband 
and wife. 
MR. CHUNTZ: May I have this marked? I move 
to admit Exhibit 6. 
THE COURT: Any objections? 
MR. PATTON: No, I'd like counsel to lay a 
little more foundation. I'm not sure my client 
understands what it was. Again, this is the type of 
document counsel and I talked about, we're not going 
to object and bring a lot of people in. 
THE COURT: Is it at 245 South? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Yes, I believe it is. 
1 MR. PATTON: No objection. 
2 THE COURT: It will be received. 
3 (Exhibit No. 6 received into evidence) 
4 Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: So your parents deeded that 
5 property to you and Andrea, right? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. And you didn't try to talk your mom or dad 
8 out of doing that? 
9 A. No, sir, we tried to -- not we -- I tried to 
10 talk to them that they ought to deed that place to 
11 somebody or else the State's going to end up with it. 
12 Q. And so they deeded it to both you and she? 
13 A. Too late. We hadn't had it in our names 
14 for -- I believe the time was 33 months, and we only 
15 had it 11 months in our name, and dad was in a rest 
16 home and as soon as mother passed away the place filed 
17 back to dad in his name, and the State said we had to 
18 sell it or get -- they just told us we had to sell it 
19 in order for dad to stay in the rest home. 
20 Q. Was Andrea taking care of your parents at 
21 that time? 
22 A. Off and on, yes. I stayed with mother quite 
23 a bit at nights. 
24 Q. You did? 
25 A. Yes, while dad was in the rest home or while 
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she was alone. 
Q. She was down there taking care of your mom 
during the day? 
A. At times, not all the time. 
Q. In February of 1996 you were interested in 
selling the subject property, weren't you? 
A. 1996? 
Q. 1996. You entered into a real estate sales 
agreement with a Mr. Mullen, GM Development? 
A. I didn't. 
Q. You didn't? 
A. Is that the one that -- okay, it was with 
David Gardner and it fell through? 
Q. Let me show you, I believe it probably is, 
and I'll show you a document marked Exhibit 7, and let 
me ask you if--
A. That's my--
Q. Is that your signature? 
A. Yes. So is that the agreement that was--
Q. Do you remember what that is? Do you recall 
that agreement? 
A. No, but I signed it. 
Q. Do you recall entering into an agreement 
with GM Development and Mr. Mullen? 
A. Well, it's just one that Jim had us sign. 
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Q. 
money on 
A. 
Do you remember getting $10,000 earnest 
the agreement? 
He said something about it, but I never 
get it, no. 
Q. 
through? 
' A. 
Q. 
The agreement that you recall, did that 
Yes. This one? 
Yes. 
did 
fall 
A. Yes. 
Q. It fell through? 
A. It didn't go through, yes. 
Q. And you had to give back the earnest money? 
A. I never did see it. 
Q. Do you recall this Exhibit marked No. 8? 
Your signature's on that. 
A. What's this on? 
Q. This is an escrow agreement whereby you 
instruct the title company to return the $10,000 to GM 
Development. 
A. Yes, he said something about -- Jim 
explained something about that if they didn't do it in 
so many months, I believe, that you had -- that they 
were -- I didn't have to pay it; is that right? 
Q. So you signed that agreement? 
A. Yes, that's my signature. 
1 MR. CHUNTZ: I move to admit 7 and 8. 
2 MR. PATTON: No objection. 
3 THE COURT: Seven and eight will be 
4 received. 
5 (Exhibit Nos. 7 and 8 received into evidence) 
6 Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: So after that deal fell 
7 through, you still wanted to develop the property, 
8 didn't you? 
9 A. Yes and no because of the funny stories I 
10 was getting back from the way the city was accepting 
11 it when the city hadn't accepted it at all. 
12 Q. Let me show you what's been marked as 
13 Exhibit 9 and ask you if your signature appears on 
14 this document. 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. That document is entitled a "Contract?" 
17 MR. PATTON: Your Honor, I don't have any 
18 objection if he stands next to my client and points to 
19 the document and help my client find those things. 
20 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
21 MR. CHUNTZ: I'm going to give him an 
22 opportunity to read it, see if he recalls it. 
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, I remember it. 
24 Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: This is an agreement that 
25 you entered into with your wife and James Demita? 
1 A. Yes, this is the one that I should have 
2 talked to my attorney about and I didn't. 
3 Q. And this is an agreement that was putting a 
4 prior oral agreement in writing? 
5 A. It says yes, 25 percent. 
6 Q. James was going to get 25 percent, wasn't 
7 he, of the property? 
8 A. That's what it says on here, yes, value of 
9 the lot, yes. 
10 Q. So you were willing to transfer a portion of 
11 the proceeds from the sale of those lots--
12 A. This was if he developed it, which he never 
13 did. 
14 Q. I understand, but you were willing to--
15 A. Well, why is it still in force? 
16 THE COURT: Just a minute, sir. Please 
17 answer the questions. 
18 Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: You were willing to go 
19 forward with this transaction? 
20 A. Yes, if he developed it. 
21 MR. CHUNTZ: I move to admit No. 9. 
22 MR. PATTON: No objection. 
23 THE COURT: Number 9 will be received. 
24 (Exhibit No. 9 received into evidence) 
25 Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: That was in -- you entered 
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into that agreement in late April of 1996, right? 
A. What's the date on it, I don't know. 
Q. That's what it says, April 26th. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Did the three of you continue with 
development activities, trying to get the property 
developed? 
A. No, I think shortly after that I stopped it, 
Q. Did you? When did you stop it? 
A. When I found out what he was doing to me. 
Q. When was that? 
A. A little past this date that was on there. 
Q. A little past, is that a few days, a few 
weeks, a few months? 
A. I don't know when it was. As soon as I 
found out from the city that none of this stuff had 
been passed through that he said had been all voted 
on. Nothing had been passed by the city, that's what 
they told me. 
Q. Let me show you what's been marked as 
Exhibit 10. Do you recognize that document? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What's River and Park view Estates? 
A. That's the name we agreed on. 
Q. What is the document? 
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A. What is the document? 
Q. Yes. Have you ever seen this or something 
like this before? 
A. This document? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes, I guess. This is the one that they 
had --he had LEI map out. 
Q. Who's "he?" 
A. James. 
Q. Did you hire LEI? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Did you have anything to do with LEI? 
A. No. 
Q. How about paying them for their services? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You paid them for their services? 
A. After this was all mapped out, yes. 
Q. You knew they were doing that, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember having the whole property 
surveyed? 
A. By LEI? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you talk with LEI about any of this 
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development or mapping out the property? 
A. No. 
Q. The date on Exhibit 10 shows 6/96. Is that 
when LEI did its work? 
A. I can't tell you that -- yes, if that's the 
date on it. 
Q. Do you have a recollection yourself? 
A. No, I don't. If that's when it's dated, 
that's when they did the work, I guess. 
MR. CHUNTZ: I move to admit 10. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. PATTON: And 10 was the topographical 
map? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Yeah, the plat map. 
MR. PATTON: No objection. 
THE COURT: Ten will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 10 received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: Exhibit 11 consists of two 
checks for the -- copies of the two checks. Do you 
recognize these two checks? 
A. No, I don't. That's not my writing. 
Q. That's not your writing? 
A. No. 
Q. Is this your signature down in here? 
A. This is mine, yes. 
1 Q. That's your signature down in here? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. These are checks to whom? 
4 A. LEI Engineers. 
5 Q. What are the dates on the two checks? 
6 A. June 1st of 1996 and June 17th of 1996. 
7 Q. And are there notations on those checks as 
8 to what these payments were for? 
9 A. Subdivision, yes. 
10 Q. These had to do with the subdivision? 
11 A. That's what it says on here, yes. 
12 Q. And you signed these checks? 
13 A. I must have, that's my signature, yes. 
14 Q. But you don't recall now being involved with 
15 LEI and what they were doing? What are the dates on 
16 the two checks? 
17 A. One is the 1st of June and the other is the 
18 17th. 
19 Q. Of June? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Both in 1996? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. So you were paying money to LEI, signing 
24 checks, but you didn't know what they were doing? 
25 A. Okay, this one was on the --he said that 
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this on the -- when they mapped it out for $1400. 
Q. And is that the subdivision plot, Exhibit 10 
that I just showed you? That's what that was for when 
they mapped it out? 
A. I think so. 
Q. And did you get to see that at the time it 
was done? 
A. Showed us that, yes. 
Q. So you did see it and you paid for it? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CHUNTZ: We move to admit Exhibit 11. 
MR. PATTON: No objection. 
THE COURT: Eleven will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 11 received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: In June of 1996 you were 
still working on the project, weren't you? 
A. It looks like it, yes. When was this 
that -- the question before that, what was it you 
asked about, if you remember. 
Q. If I remember I'll ask it again. I'm sorry, 
I don't remember. Let me show you Exhibit 12. Do you 
remember getting this bill from LEI? 
A. This is that $1400. 
Q. I think that's a different $1400. 
A. No, I only paid them once, didn't I? 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Well, I think not. If it will help--
I made two checks after that $1400? 
Let me show you Exhibit 13, and ask you if 
your signature appears at the bottom of this. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, that's it. 
That's it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's another check for $1405, that's the 
amount of this invoice, right? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What's the date on the invoice? 
A. This is in September. 
Q. This is in September, in fact it's September 
3 0th that you paid it; isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you were still working with LEI in 
September of 1996? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Working on developing this property? 
A. It looks like it. 
MR. CHUNTZ: I move to admit 12 and 13. 
MR. PATTON: No objection. 
THE COURT: Twelve and thirteen will be 
received. 
(Exhibit Nos. 12 and 13 received into evidence) 
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Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: Let me show you Exhibit No. 
14. Is your signature there on this one? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And this one is made out to Newman Bundy? 
A. Yes, I owed him $500. 
Q. He delivered some dirt to the property, 
right? That was part of the development of the 
property, wasn't it? 
A. No, that was part of the -- just to fill up 
the land, and they had some dirt they wanted to get 
rid of. 
Q. But you needed the dirt to fill in the land? 
A. Yeah, we agreed that -- I agreed to buy it, 
yes. 
Q. And that was part of the development process 
that you were going through there in September? 
A. Yes, if that's what you want to call it, the 
development project. Yeah. 
MR. CHUNTZ: I move to admit 14. 
MR. PATTON: No objection. 
THE COURT: Fourteen will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 14 received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: In fact, you were still 
going forward with the development of the project in 
trying to get in position to sell lots and trying to 
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have James work with the city all the way up until 
April of 1997, weren't you? 
A. I don't know, was it that late? 
Q. Do you remember talking to your daughter, 
Phyllis, and asking her to contact the city and find 
out what was going on? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was in about April of 1997? 
A. I don't know the time. 
Q. Let me show you Exhibit 15, it's the letter 
that Phyllis received. Did you ever get to see this? 
Look at that letter. Do you remember having a 
conversation with Phyllis about that letter or seeing 
that letter before? 
A. Just a minute. I don't remember, but this 
is the one that she we went to Comstock and received, 
yes. 
Q. Comstock, he's the planning--
A. Yes, engineer. 
Q. Planning engineer for Spanish Fork? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ask her to go and see him? 
A. Yes, talk to him. 
Q. Why was that? 
A. Because all the stuff that he was telling me 
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that hadn't been--
Q. Are you talking about James Demita? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So James was telling you things about the 
project? 
A. He was going to these council meetings, and 
he would come home and say, "Well, I can't believe how 
fast they accepted all these things, and it's all 
passed," and I went to Comstock and he said no, it 
hadn't been passed by the city at all. 
Q. So you asked your daughter to talk to--
Talk to Comstock, yes. 
And that was just before you got this 
A 
Q 
letter? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
So before you learned that, you were still 
moving ahead with James and--
A. Well, yes, I thought he was being truthful 
with me. 
Q. The three of you were still trying to 
develop the property to sell as late as April, and 
maybe even as late as May of 1997? 
A. I didn't think it was that late. 
Q. Well, the letter is May 5, 1997? 
A. May 5th, yes. 
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Q. Then you got angry after you learned that 
James wasn't telling you the truth, right? 
A. Yes, I was angry before, too. 
Q. But you were willing to continue developing 
the property with him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then you went to see your lawyer after you 
got this letter -- saw this letter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's when you went to see him about 
getting a divorce, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's when you asked Phyllis to go over and 
check on the records to see who owned the property; is 
that right? 
A. No, I believe--
Q. Mr. Patton asked that? 
A. Wasn't it that way? 
MR. PATTON: Counsel, do you want me to 
testify? 
MR. CHUNTZ: No, it's all right. 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: Either you or Mr. Patton 
asked your daughter to go check on the records about 
the property? 
A. Get a deed for the property, yes, when she 
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found out about that it had been done. 
MR. CHUNTZ: We move to admit 15. 
MR. PATT0N: Your Honor, I want to make my 
objection clear because I'm only objecting to the 
admission of 15 if it's being admitted for the 
purposes of what's stated in the letter, what's 
stated in the letter is hearsay, and so therefore I'm 
objecting to it being submitted for purposes of the 
truthfulness of the letter. 
However, if what he's submitting is to see 
that my client was aware of the letter and had 
received a copy of it, (inaudible) or at least seen a 
copy, I'm not objecting to that. But for purposes of 
the truthfulness of the letter itself, we object. 
MR. CHUNTZ: I'm not offering it for the 
subject matter of the letter. 
THE COURT: Okay, it will be received. 
(Exhibit No. 15 received into evidence) 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: During this whole period 
when you and James and Andrea were working on 
developing the property, you weren't contemplating 
divorce then, were you? 
A. I really can't say. 
Q. You hadn't gone to see a lawyer about 
getting a divorce, had you? 
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A, NO. 
Q. You were still working with Andrea and James 
to get this property developed, weren't you? 
A. I must have. 
Q. That's what the documents seem to show, 
don't they? 
A. Yes. But I could begin to see what a mess I 
was getting in. 
Q. So you were beginning to see that you were 
not going to be happy? 
A. Yes, I was beginning to see that it wasn't 
his land, it was my land, I had to pay the consequence 
of what I gave him to do, and I paid the consequences 
of it. 
Q. So you weren't happy with the deal that you 
entered into with him? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. You wanted to get out of that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you still weren't looking to divorce 
Andrea at that point, were you? 
A. I don't know, there's been quite a few times 
it's come up. 
Q. Now you've got other real property -- real 
estate --in addition to the subject property here, 
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the marital home, don't you? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
The marital home? 
Yeah, the place where you and Andrea lived. 
Yes. No, I don't, no. 
You have some property in a place called 
Aspen Hills? 
A. 
there? 
Q. 
A. 
No. What made you think I have property up 
That was dropped many years ago. 
When was that dropped? 
I don't know, but I sold it -- I went up 
there and 
I buy it? 
Q. 
1986, and 
August of 
A. 
up there. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
though? 
A. 
1
 still own 
Q. 
had that stopped a long time ago. When did 
Well, I know you had it at least back in 
in your answers to interrogatories back in 
1997, you listed real property in Indianola. 
No, that's not mine. I don't have nothing 
You don't have anything up there, either? 
No, I don't. 
You did have property in Aspen Hills, 
No. I let that go a long time ago. If I 
it, it's never been paid for. 
That would be a pretty good deal. I don't 
know if you own it or not. 
A. I don't own it. 
Q. In 1996 and in 1997 Andrea didn't owe you 
any money, did she? 
A. No, I don't think so. 
Q. You've never claimed that she's owed you any 
money, have you? 
A. No. 
Q. You weren't demanding or insisting that --
in 1996 you weren't demanding her or insisting that 
she give you back the half of the property that you 
had deeded over to her, were you? 
A. You mean the property that she owned? 
Q. No, I'm talking about the farm, the subject 
property. You weren't asking or demanding that she 
give it back to you in 1996, were you? 
A. I could have been, yes. 
Q. You could have been? 
A. I wanted her to sign it back, I don't know 
what year it was. 
Q. But you and she were trying to develop it in 
1996? 
A. No, it wasn't then, it was before then. 
Q. You were aware in 1996 that if you died 
before Andrea did, that she would get all of the 
property and your kids wouldn't get any of it, weren't 
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you? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. You weren't aware of that? 
A. No. My understanding was that it would go 
half. 
Q. You hadn't talked with anybody about what 
joint tenancy meant? 
A. No. Joint tenancy, that would mean both of 
us, wouldn't it? 
Q. Did your daughter ever talk with you about 
what would happen if you died, what would happen to 
the property? 
A. No. 
Q. She never talked with you about it? 
A. My daughter? 
Q. Yes, your daughter, Phyllis. 
A. She might have, I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember her ever talking with you 
about getting the property taken out of joint tenancy 
so that she could get half of the property? 
A. NO. 
Q. That wasn't a concern of yours? 
A. Well, no, I don't think it was, not right 
then. When was this? 
Q. 1996. 
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A 
A. I can't remember. 
Q. What do you remember about it? 
A. Talking to her about it, the property. 
Q. What do you remember about that? Did you 
ever have a concern that Andrea would get all of the 
property if you died first? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. You never worried about that? 
A. Well, I signed it expecting that -- her name 
on there expecting that she would only get half of it. 
Q. And that was your intention, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I want to take a look at part of Exhibit 3 
with you, your financial declaration. Let me show you 
where I'm looking. You've indicated here that your 
gross income from your employment is $638, and that 
your net income is $410; is that right? 
A. Yes, pretty close. 
Q. And the amount that--
A. That's an average of the whole year. 
Q. And the average of the deductions that are 
coming out are listed down here, $60 for federal and 
state tax, right? 
A. Just the state, the federal wasn't taken 
out. 
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Q. There was nothing taken out? 
A. Not at the school, no. 
Q. $35 per month for FICA, Social Security? 
A. Yes, they take that out automatically. 
Q. $8 per month for--
A. This is medical insurance. 
Q. That's the $165. 
A. That's Geneva. 
Q. You're right. And then you have this $105 
that you've listed as a deduction, and that's 
(inaudible)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's a savings account, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You put that in every month? 
A. Yes, they take it out, yes. 
Q. And you're still taking that out every 
month; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So really what comes out of this $638 every 
month for taxes are the $103 that go to governments, 
right, the $60, the $35 and the $8? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the rest just goes into an account --
the $105 goes into an account for you; is that 
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correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
$638, we' 
disposabl 
A. 
Q-
A. 
Yes. 
It's $105 to (inaudible), that goes to you? 
Yes. 
So if we take that $103 for taxes off of the 
re left with $535 a month that you've got in 
e income after taxes from your employment? 
Wait, now I don't understand. 
Let me point it out. 
All of these are taken out in taxes from 
there down to--
Q < 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
adds up 
that si 
A. 
don't c 
Q. 
Well, (inaudible) isn't a tax, is it? 
No, but there down to there. 
And $165 for your medical insurance--
That's Geneva. 
That's for your medical, right? 
Medical, yes. 
Taxes are $60, $35, and $8? 
Yes. 
Unless counsel corrects me, I believe 
> to $103. If you subtract $103 from the 
lould be $535. 
No. I'd be getting that much in cash? 
ret that much. 
I know you don't because you put $105 
that 
$638 
> I 
into 
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(inaudible). 
A. (inaudible) yes. 
Q. So this was $535, and then you told us that 
this is $329 for Geneva? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's because $165 comes off of this 
$469, doesn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you get $769 from Social Security? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And my calculator tells me that those three 
net amounts equal $633 as disposable income that you 
have every month. Does that seem right to you? 
MR. PATT0N: Your Honor, if I may interject, 
I'm going to object just because of the nature of the 
conversation. I think we indicated in my client's 
direct testimony sometimes he has trouble, I think he 
explained why he had Phyllis trying to fill it out, 
because we had trouble with this and some of those 
numbers. 
I don't dispute, counsel, that in closing 
argument you can say "This number, if my addition is 
correct--" I think what he's asking my client to do, 
my client probably can't do without a calculator, and 
just physically can't answer the questions. I know 
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where (inaudible) is going, he has a right to answer 
it, the numbers are what they are, we don't dispute 
that. I think pursuing this is starting to reach the 
point of harassment of my client simply because he 
can't do the numbers in his head. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. CHUNTZ: That's all the questions I 
have. 
THE WITNESS: Can I ask you a question? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Maybe after court is over, but 
not at the present time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Patton, do you have any 
further inquiry of your client? 
MR. PATTON: Yes, your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PATTON: 
Q. Mr. Bradford, these documents, the contract 
with Mr. Mullen, the working up, the LEI, the 
surveyors, et cetera, did you do that or did Mr. 
Demita do that? 
A. He hired it done, yes. 
Q. And these documents, did you prepare them or 
did Mr. Demita prepare them? 
A. Jim. 
Q. And he brought them to you and had you sign 
1 them? 
2 A. They billed -- whether they -- I got a note 
3 from them or whether they told Andrea, and Andrea told 
4 I me that this is what I owe them, I don't know. 
Q. And you were trying to say something about 
6 I Mr. Demita would get a percentage of the property if 
7 the property was actually sold or actually -- and you 
8 got cut off. What was your understanding of what 
9 would happen? 
10 A. That I would owe him 25 percent --it says 
11 on there on the document that I would owe him 25 
12 percent of each lot; was that the way it read? 
13 Q. What was your understanding? I'm not asking 
14 you what it read, I'm asking what your understanding 
15 of it was. 
16 A. That he would end up with a lot of money. 
17 Q. If it was developed? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Did you expect that he would get half the 
20 property from Andrea and get an additional 25 percent? 
21 A. Yes, that's the way I figured it. 
22 Q. No, no, no. Mr. Bradford, listen to what 
23 I'm saying. At any of the time that you signed that 
24 25 percent contract that you were trying to develop, 
25 did you know that Andrea had already deeded over half 
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the property to him? 
A. Now when was this, what year? 
Q. 1996. Counsel asked you about trying to 
develop the property in 1996 and early 1997. Do you 
remember those conversations that he talked about? 
A. No, I don't really. 
Q. Do you remember counsel asking you about you 
and Mr. Demita and Andrea trying to develop the 
property from 1996 and in the first part of 1997? 
A. Yes. 
Q. During the period of time that you and Mr. 
Demita and Andrea were trying to develop the property, 
were you aware of the fact that Andrea had already 
deeded one-half of the property to Mr. Demita? 
A. No. Now this had happened -- when was this, 
August of 1996 that this happened, that she had--
Q. Well, I can't answer those. 
A. Okay, but it was early--
Q. When did you find out that Andrea had 
deeded--
A. When she had gone to the county to get a 
copy of the deed. 
Q. And who is "she" went to get a copy? 
A. That's Phyllis, my daughter. 
Q. So that would have been about the same time 
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you saw the letter from Spanish Fork; is that; right? 
A. I J i i "'"oiristi o e k ? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I never did see if, she Look it: right over 
t 3 ;\, Dl Mt! J ijl I I '" I I! I- "ITU-" 11 it, J e I.' S e e I IT \ I I" 
Q. ;:••• Cornstock letter appears t.u be dated May 
h, ±y? / . " L~ ' the time Phyllis got this letter, is 
that about the same Lime ymi Lomei uui. I; lid! Andrea IiacJ 
deeded the property? 
A. it must have been, because that was in 
n^w wha^ dat^ was ' ::a 
August wcasr. : i: *n- \™G taken *-
t * ? 
:ocument speaks tor iLbt-'ll I 
can't answer your questions. When you were dealing 
with I'll I »t:?njj i i-i i. one e m 1 rig the development of the 
property, were you trying to deal with him "in any 
dishonest way? 
A. 
M When you deeded the property to Andrea and 
when yri11 were doing those things with .Andrea, when you 
d e e d e d ill i n h n l h i I ,11111 in l i n e s I o 1 , MI I n- I i e ' e : I l /ha t 
you and Andrea would continue to be married? 
A. 'res. 
I ll> I 'ATTUN l ie ! u, I t h e , C 
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questions. 
THE COURT: . o. .;..:. ^ . ^ a 
short break. 
(,Sh • 
PATTOI (Court alreaa\ in session whei 1 
recorder was #u:::ee :. Penner, who ; • • I 
:\ -r - • - . - -rr lain why 
T\ .:•.•:* 'iiz:-. : :ic .-.-.• well explaining his numbers on 
;;^ b ij.:*v*:ir;.a . declaration, 
:::a ] 3 = ci t :: test i fj she w :: "i :i ] ! :i 
t e s t i f y tha*. . • •
 s . sometimes her dad doesn't dc real 
well with numbers, that she tried to assist him with 
" A 
source;-: wer~, -A; i :. rial -omt." of : he figures that 
gave n: Exhibif vere =3^*- :-=3l>' figures thar sh^ and : 
came ur *. . . - .._..__.-. •: 
information ** -, ;eve *- !~ corre-r ; r.; iX 
counsel wants me to do ariythi nq other than ji ist 
pi ~: : v_ -.at and hp can : can: ii i le h e r :i f 1 
want.- • :orrec :ounsel? 
CHUNiZi: I- ± uuii L have a problem 
*.• _ - ^ T/m
 not ac. ^  to cross examine her. 
THE COURT- * ight. accept the 
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1 MR. PATTON: w^th. that., your Honor, we would 
2 rest 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Chuntz? 
4 MR. CHUNTZ: I call Andrea Bradford back 
5 d. 
6 I THE COURT: I just remind you that you're 
still under oath. 
ANDREA BRADFORD 
9 I having been first duly sworn, 
10 testifies as follows: 
11 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 | BY MR. CHUNTZ. 
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A. 
Q. 
• 
W 
** 
. ranuary 
Sx..: > : ..ve . 
Sixty™ three. 
ve dii-
. . .3 your c-
i nl 1 i 11 i" W 
x r 
. :*•_ :vaaL _ . 
George testify, I bel 
Are you presently employed 
No 
Have ) ou worked outside of 
mar- iage? 
outside 
the home 
j.L 
ieve his 
of the 
during 
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I A . 
o. 
\ es . 
doing w:. .^ George was « 
'r >~ f: r s t year . . + » .* 
v* 
* i f -
^ "•» *~ _ 
i wiiac 
w.-^ - going 
x
 ~. ~=ime 
nome ar^ur : - lorning and l~2t again about 
i :>- ^orning. S^ • ::-- r- f -r~ r :m^ *-: making 
with trie house .;- i ::-ie \ ar^ aiu t:.e urcpert^ <•* 
aroi:nc ' %~ house *"r^rG -v'*~ ?"-i r^.d -verythina and 
-M: >>-: - y:;u taking care > : -
A I was taking care of his mother and father, 
and a.J so at that time hi s • laughter was 1 :i ( :i i ig A :i th i :i s 
with her new baby., and I was taking care of all of the 
cleaning ana a: -::. the shopping and the bills and the 
mail and every*: ,;. :;g r.hat np'-,:r : »e -
v- nw-.rh time di z. you spend taking care of 
I I. : " ifo ' ••- .- ev- -. - - average? 
, average - > ..-' about loin hours 
a day doing laundry--
Q a ao uhis? 
Pardon? 
v. How' many years di d you do this? 
A. Si nc- s I got ma i: i : i ed in 198 5 until they died 
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Q When d:i d they die; do you recall? 
A One :l:i e :i i n I can't remember the exact 
year, ..... remember the years that they died, but: 
:i t: was .v least ••? Lght or ni ne years 
«:; uiu yuu take emp] oyment outside of the home 
during the marriage? 
Jheneve: ; t>-. • i:a* * • -'^ \
 5 .-• i 1 1* tie 
Ope: • / 1UI Hit; L U icavc J-wny 
enouwj:: <~a. ... ... .*.e T^. .. w o c 
- A r.. -. i- :m- ~r \ . * - *- it side .:: 
ll,C»ITli 
vt-; v often because there was *-™ ™*™, 
neeaw : b^ i n- *r *•::> household. 
Q. 
of tim- * iicti ,,_;. wji^e: outsia« JI tne nome dur^.j tne 
marriage,, or maybe an average per year, something like 
that :i f j c i I ::.i:iii > 
A About: maybe in one year I would go in and 
out G^JLXXV.. -':• .TV '* - about three months of work 
0. mc nths 
.- \ , ?->: ^i ; i ' -e tfere m a r r i e d t o George? 
remember, I don' t: t h ink so 
n wprp moQf vparc? ipqq i, J'ictn t .hree iu< »nt„„ hs } 
- s . 
Q. Have j„^ WCIKUJ _ j t s i . d e t h e home . .:.<.- l a s t 
few years? 
A. r I'ot: h j iiiL) .ill -ill, .MIP ."ii .-411 I was too busy 
working on the developing, it was a lot ot work i.u 
the back, the clean-up 
0. II LU temporary 
servi ce^- z o ae* ~vr>z * ~iy. . - \-
^i.. 
o. ^ 
services, what i:.i tr;es *~ 
A. T \ - • f'il'fy f:: product, or. 
wor^ and , 
get ra:i i. : ^:,:.* . * -r *r -5 ,!:-1 - another 
re.; ea LU wur^ sporadically so I 
wou-v;; . rn\/ wri^r 
*.-:-.• w h y .': *• i - : : *"r-"- n " " 
* * ' r*. y ^ * 
.- ^ .o because L ; . - \ 
! Hi I,hey had. my name on t h e i r computei at .SOS not 
i I mi1 KM k IM I'PVI I i II companies t h a t t o l d them 
not to send me inco th ... company to work. 
Did they tel ^ . wr:/ they didn't want, you 
A m^-*- T -\-rj2 dr' *~ ^ ^r-^f? -?^
 Woi i T needed 
uw couldn • t'oru.^  ' • I 
Q lis as your 
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: inanc ia l declarat ion? 
A. 
n 
Q.r>rl ., 
K-; t-
shows that you get: 
zi indicated that'& gone up a little 
get £"3~ because now .^ :~~e 
> D uii January 1st
 w; w*;-~ j~—, so 
•il 
2, we've calculated 
al secur i ty , your 
T I ^ C K . : . a c -M . . 
i i i i i 
to Dr Lynn Richards? 
A Y* 
0 fi ' «" '" I '' I i! k~*f ! U - l 1 i-"j i-"i]™i t- ]_ g r *p 
eu Lhere, one 
v- - remember who the other dentist is? 
A T 
c ; aie paying on those? 
-o waiting to see who is going to 
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pay, because it's under George's -- at that time I was 
married to George, and he was billed for the bill. 
Q. And these debts are -- these doctors are 
being patient with you? 
A. Pardon? 
Q. These doctors are being patient with you 
right now? 
A. Yes, they are. 
Q. If you'll turn the page and look at No. 6 
where it lists all of your expenses, you've had a 
chance to review all of these expenses after we 
prepared the document; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it would be your testimony that these 
are the amounts that you are currently having to 
spend, with exception of the rent money and utilities? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you're not paying any rent because 
you're living in the marital home? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you're not paying any utilities because 
Mr. Bradford was ordered to pay the utilities? 
A. That's right. 
Q. So once this divorce is over and you're 
living in your own place, or Mr. Bradford is no longer 
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living wi 
utilities 
A. 
Q. 
paying 
month? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
th you, you expect that you'll have to pay 
in the amount of $120 a month? 
Yes. 
So your monthly expenses without any rent --
any rent at all is still going to be $1150 per 
Yes. 
And you have available to you $3 72? 
Yes. 
Are you requesting that Mr. Bradford 
continue paying you alimony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you requesting that that alimony be in 
the amount of $600 per month? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There's been testimony that Mr. Bradford 
deeded over the marital residence joint tenancy 
interest to you in 1989; is that correct? 
A. Yes, that's correct. 
Q. Did Mr. Bradford ever tell you why he did 
this? 
A. A few times. 
Q. What did he tell you? 
A. That I love you, that's why -- and I want to 
take care of you, I want you to have half. 
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Q. And you deeded your half of the property to 
James in 1996? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You've heard testimony here today about the 
bank accounts and retirement accounts and life 
insurance cash values that are in George's name. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you asking for half of the value of all 
of those assets? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. If the Court decides that your deeding the 
property to James was okay, are you asking for any 
portion of Mr. Bradford's half of the property? 
A. Absolutely no. 
Q. If the Court decides that you should not 
have deeded the property to James, do you want the 
Court to allow you to live in the home with your 
grandson and James? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If the Court decides that you should not 
have deeded the property to James, do you believe that 
you should be entitled to your half of the property? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CHUNTZ: That's all I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
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MR. PATTON: Yes, your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PATTON: 
Q. Mrs. Bradford, if the Court decides that Mr. 
Demita owns half the property --in other words he 
owns half and George owns half, if I'm correct, you're 
stating you agree that you don't own half of George's 
half; is that right? In other words, if it belongs to 
Mr. Demita and Mr. Bradford, you don't own any portion 
of Mr. Bradford's; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Do you own any part of Mr. Demita's if the 
Court says that? 
A. We're family. 
Q. Which means what? 
A. That we take care of each other. 
Q. So if the Court were to give half of this 
property -- determine that half of it belongs to Mr. 
Demita, you believe that Mr. Demita would take care of 
you? 
A. If I needed it, if I needed caring. 
Q. If the Court determined that Mr. Demita 
could purchase Mr. Bradford's interest out of the 
property, in other words he gets to purchase the 
property from Mr. Bradford and not Mr. Bradford from 
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Mr. Demita, would Mr. Demita continue to allow you to 
live there? 
A. 
Q. 
wouldn't 
payment 
A. 
Q. 
If I asked him, yes. 
And if you continued to live there you 
: have the $600 a month rent or mortgage | 
, would you? 
No. 
And on your financial declaration that you 
listed what your income is, you didn't list the $150 
that Mr 
A. 
Q. 
he pays 
J A . 
nothing 
. Demita gives you for child care, did you? 
It's not my child, though. 
But wasn't your testimony this morning that 
you $150 a month to watch his child? 
And I use it on his child, but it has 
to do with my needs, though. That's just a 
child's needs being met, but my needs aren't met. 
Q. Can you tell the Court how long you've had 
this carpal tunnel problem? 
A. The last two years I haven't had it because 
I haven't gone to work because of that mostly. I 
didn't want to expound on it, you know, make it worse. 
Q. So you haven't done anything in the last two 
years to make that worse? 
A. Except for the work I did around the 
property. I've hurt myself different times working on 
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the property like a man. 
Q. But you were able to work around the 
property like a man, then? 
A. Well, at my own pace. At the factories they 
make you keep up with an assembly line, and then that 
aggravates the carpal tunnel where you can't stop and 
rest it. Days I didn't do things -- I didn't work 
every day like a man at the property, just when my 
health and strength would allow it. 
Q. Do you have problems focusing? I mean there 
was some comment about you had trouble focusing. Do 
you agree you have trouble focusing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Andrea -- is it Andrea or Andrea? 
A. It doesn't matter. 
Q. If the Court concludes that Mr. Demita owns 
half the property and that Mr. Bradford owns half the 
property, he says that deed's valid, it's upheld, but 
then he decides that--
A. Who's "he?" 
Q. The judge. But then the judge decides or 
rules that it was a dissipation, that you didn't have 
any right to transfer the property away --in other 
words what I'm saying is he says the deed is valid, 
Mr. Demita owns the property or owns half of it, but 
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then he rules "Mrs. Bradford, you didn't have any 
right to transfer it, therefore you shouldn't have 
done that, and you owe Mr. Bradford half the value of 
that land," you would owe Mr. Bradford $60,000 or 
$70,000 minimum, wouldn't you? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Objection, I think it's calling 
for a legal conclusion. He's giving argument and 
asking her to--
THE COURT: Where are you headed with this, 
counsel? 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, what I'm trying to 
establish is really that she doesn't have $60,000 or 
$70,000 worth of assets to pay my client, and that's 
clearly relevant because it goes to the issue of 
solvency, and it's one of the possibilities that this 
Court can issue a ruling on. 
This Court can conclude that the deed is 
valid, but it was a dissipation of assets, and as such 
therefore she has to pay that back to the marital 
estate, and at even the lowest figure I can come up 
with, taking out costs of sale, taking out having to 
repair the tanks, et cetera, she would still owe the 
marital estate $60,000 to $70,000. If you want me to 
ask it that way, I'll withdraw that question and say, 
"Do you have $60,000 or $70,000 worth of assets you 
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could pay the marital estate?" 
MR. CHUNTZ: And I would say asked and 
answered. If that's the question and that's where 
he's going with it, he put her through that whole 
rigamorole on direct examination when he had her up on 
the stand, and asked about every piece of property she 
had and how much value it was and --he already knows 
the answer. 
MR. PATTON: Are you stipulating she 
doesn'1? 
THE COURT: Overruled, go ahead. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Andrea Bradford, do you have 
$60,000 or $70,000 worth of assets that you could pay 
back to the marital estate if that's what the Court 
orders you to do? 
A. Personally, no, but I possibly -- definitely 
could get it. 
Q. From where? 
A. That is my business. 
MR. PATTON: Your Honor, I'm going to ask 
you that you instruct her to answer. 
THE COURT: Please answer the question, 
ma'am. 
THE WITNESS: I have family. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: So you would get that money 
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from the family? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you don't personally have those assets? 
A. No. 
MR. PATTON: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. CHUNTZ: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. CHUNTZ: Your Honor, could we have a 
five minute recess? I want to call Mr. Demita, but he 
needs to call his son. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
(Short recess taken) 
THE COURT: Come forward and be sworn. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this case now 
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
JAMES DEMITA 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHUNTZ: 
Q. Please state your name for the record. 
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A James A. Demita. 
Q. And where do you reside? 
A. 1100 South Main in Spanish Fork. 
Q. Who do you reside there with? 
A. My mother and step-father and my son. 
Q. You've heard testimony that your mother 
deeded you by quit claim deed all of her interest in 
the property where you reside; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And that was in August of 1996? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you involved -- did you discuss this 
transfer of the property with your mother prior to its 
being deeded? 
A. Yes, most of the discussion was with you and 
my mother, but I discussed it with her as well. 
Q. Did you have a concern about what would 
happen to her share of the property if she died before 
Mr. Bradford? 
A. Yes, actually both sides of that coin 
because my mother didn't necessarily know if it was 
great to -- if Mr. Bradford were to die first then she 
would get it all, and she thought it would be more 
fair just to make sure both sides got half with how it 
stood, you know, Mr. Bradford got half, she got half, 
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so she just wanted to make sure that both sides of the 
family got their half instead of one getting it all 
and the other nothing. 
Q. You heard my questions and Mr. Bradford's 
answers about developing the subject property. 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long had he and you been talking about 
doing that, say before August of 1996? 
A. How many months before? 
Q. Yes. 
A. We initially started in approximately 
December of 1995, late December of 1995. 
Q. And then you went through assisting in 
getting these contracts drawn up and entered into? 
A. Well, I didn't draw the contracts up, I 
called around and tried to find people (inaudible) 
selling the land to be developed, I contacted 
different developers and saw if any of them would be 
interested in purchasing it, and then Mr. Mullen and 
Mr. Gardner had their attorney, I'm assuming --
actually Mr. Mullen's an attorney, from what I 
understand. 
Anyway, they provided the documents and then 
I had a friend that used an attorney up at Snow, 
Christensen, and Martineau in Salt Lake and he agreed 
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to look over the documents just in George and my 
mother's behalf, just to see if there was any problem 
with it or whatever, and he said they looked fine, so 
then they signed them. 
Q. As the property now exists, can it be 
divided into two equal parts in a partition? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Well, it's unique, it's got the river on one 
side and then you've got city ground on the other and 
then you have the house, so I don't really know how 
you could do it equitably, especially with the house 
on it. 
Q. Are you asking the Court to award the 
property be sold pursuant to the partition statute? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you willing to buy Mr. Bradford's share 
of the property for half of its appraised value? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CHUNTZ: That's all the questions I 
have. 
Q. BY MR. CHUNTZ: Let me ask you another 
question. If the property was placed on the market 
pursuant to the partition statute, would you be 
willing to take half of the higher amount if it would 
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sell for more than the appraised value? 
A. Why don't you just say that one more time. 
Q. If the property was put up for sale pursuant 
to the statute, and a buyer was willing to pay more 
than what it's been appraised for, would you be 
satisfied in taking your half? 
A. Sure. I'd prefer to keep it, obviously, 
because my son has been living there and I've been 
living there and my mom lives there. 
Q. So if somebody was willing to offer more 
than $180,000 for the property, would you be willing 
to try to match that offer? 
A. Yeah, I would try to do that because like I 
said, I would like to keep my son -- you know, we've 
been living there for awhile now and just keep things 
stable. 
MR. CHUNTZ: Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PATTON: 
Q. Mr. Demita, you're indicating that you would 
like to do that and buy my client out. Where are you 
employed? 
A. Pardon me? 
Q. Where are you employed? 
A. Well, I do independent consulting for a 
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computer store here in town. I'm working with other 
developers right now since I gained experience in 
developing land, and working with different projects 
in the valley right now, then I do a public community 
service, I write a column in the --a weekly column in 
the newspaper. 
Q. And from all these different things that you 
do, how much money did you earn last year? 
A. Well, last year I was developing with Mr. 
Bradford so I didn't earn very much. 
Q. How much did you earn? 
A 
Q 
$3,500? 
A 
Q 
A 
Less than $3,500. 
So all of last year you earned less than 
Yes and no. 
How much did you earn in the tax year 1996? 
I'm sorry, I thought you said 1996. You 
said 1995? 
Q. No, last year was 1997. 
A. Right, so what are you asking? 
Q. Last year was 1997. 
A. Right. 
Q. How much did you earn in 1997? 
A. Less than $3,500. 
Q. How much did you earn in 1996? 
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A. I was working on land still, so it was less 
than $3,500. 
Q. And how much in 1995? 
A. Well, I was in school. 
Q. Which law school was it? 
A. In Oregon. 
Q. What was the name of the law school? 
A. Will (inaudible). 
Q. When this development discussion was going 
on, I believe your testimony was you were the one who 
was talking with the attorneys? 
A. I don't know what you mean by talking to the 
attorneys. Mr. Mullen is an attorney, one of the 
developers, and I spoke with him, yes. 
Q. I believe you spoke with somebody at 
Martineau in Salt Lake? 
A. Yes, some firm up in Salt Lake. My buddy 
that I met in law school said his family uses this guy 
and he would be willing to take a look at it for free 
and see how it looked, so I asked Mr. Bradford --
well, actually he didn't say free, he said a small 
fee, whatever his hourly fee is. So then I told Mr. 
Bradford and my mother and they said, "Yeah, go ahead 
and have him look at it." When I got up there he 
didn't charge, he just said, "It looks fine," and he 
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didn't charge. 
Q. So when you were going to do that you 
discussed that with your mother and Mr. Bradford? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Because they were involved with it and you 
wanted to be fair with them; is that right? 
A. Well, I just told them everything that was 
going on. 
Q. So you tried to be sure that they knew 
everything that was going on? 
A. At that point yes, definitely. 
Q. Are you the individual who prepared the quit 
claim deed that was signed by Andrea Bradford? 
A. I'm not sure if you mean prepared, I signed 
in the part where it was $10 -- the handwritten part I 
did. I didn't notarize it or I didn't sign her 
signature or anything. I just did the handwritten 
part that you can see on there. 
MR. PATTON: May I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: I'm going to show you my 
copy of Exhibit 1. 
A. Okay. 
Q. I'm going to show you what's been marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16 for identification and ask 
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you if you recognize that. 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. I'm going to ask you to take this yellow 
highlighter and I want you to highlight--
THE COURT: Plaintiff's 16, this is 
Plaintiff's 1. 
MR. PATTON: Well, we're making a new--
THE WITNESS: This says Plaintiff's 1, just 
so you know. I'm sorry, I thought you were saying P-l 
here (inaudible) 16, sorry. 
THE COURT: Do you want to take this one? 
MR. PATTON: We have another copy -- no, 
we're not using Plaintiff's l, we're now using 
Plaintiff's 16. 
THE COURT: What's the difference? 
MR. PATTON: 
THE COURT: 
COURT CLERK 
(inaudible). 
MR. PATTON: 
one. 
THE COURT: 
MR. PATTON: 
THE COURT: 
of the same deed? 
(inaudible) mark it. 
Make sure that' s - -
: I think we're using 
Yes, we are, this is the new 
Right, so that one--
That's 1. 
You lost me, why do we have two 
Ill 
MR. PATTON: Because this one will be 
different in just a second. This one will look 
different than that one in just a second. That's the 
one I'm going to have him mark. 
MR. CHUNTZ: If he's going to mark it I 
suppose it's okay. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: Will you highlight in yellow 
those portions that you printed in that document? 
A. Sure. 
(Witness marks document) 
Q. BY MR. PATTON: So those portions you've 
highlighted on Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16 for 
identification are the portions that you wrote in? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now the legal description of the property, 
although it's typed, it actually looks like it's been 
xeroxed on there; is that correct? 
A. I believe so. The actual -- LEI, I think, 
is the one that provided the document. 
Q. LEI provided this document? 
A. Yeah, because they had it on file, so they 
said -- I don't know if they copied it or what they 
did to it, but they said, "Here's the document," and 
then I hand wrote the part you see that's in 
1 handwriting, and then we went to the bank and an 
2 individual at Zion's Bank notarized it. 
3 Q. When you say "we" you mean you and your mom? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 MR. PATTON: Your Honor, we would submit 
6 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16 as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 
7 16. 
8 THE COURT: Any objection? 
9 MR. CHUNTZ: No objection. 
10 THE COURT: Sixteen will be received. 
11 (Exhibit No. 16 received into evidence) 
12 Q. BY MR. PATTON: I'm curious, Mr. Demita, if 
13 you had the document and you talked with Mr. Chuntz 
14 with your mom, or if you spoke with Mr. Chuntz and 
15 then you went and got the document, the quit claim 
16 deed, which occurred first? 
17 A. I didn't get the quit claim deed for some 
18 time after they discussed different options that she 
19 had before her. 
2 0 Q. My question is what was that some time, a 
21 week, two weeks? 
22 A. No, it was a few months. 
23 Q. A few months? 
24 A. Yeah, a few months. 
25 Q. So when she spoke to Mr. Chuntz about her 
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options on estate planning, that was several months 
before August? 
A. Well, I didn't say several, I said a few. 
Q. So it was a few months before August? 
A. It was in about April, I believe. 
Q. So that was in about April, and the quit 
claim deed was signed in August? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the urgency to sign the quit claim 
deed in August if you had known about it since April? 
A. There is no urgency. 
Q. Was there any particular reason it wasn't 
typed, and it was handwritten instead of being typed? 
A. I didn't have a typewriter. 
Q. In August when the quit claim deed was 
prepared, how long after you got it from these people 
that you said had it and it was signed? 
A. Not too long, I can't remember exactly. 
Q. A day, a week? 
A. It was probably in the duration of a week or 
less. 
Q. My question is it's been since April, you 
get this document evidently right at the end of July 
or the first part of August, was there any 
conversations between you and your mom at or about 
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that time as to why it had to be done then and not 
later or not earlier? 
A. Like I said, I don't know what you mean by 
"had to be done." We never --it didn't necessarily 
have to be done. That was just part of what she was 
discussing, and they said you can do a trust or you 
can quit claim it, and it's quicker, you don't have to 
have all the added fees and all that other stuff, and 
so there's no particular magical number about that 
date. That's just when it got signed. 
Q. The quit claim deed, the talking with the 
attorneys, the talking with LEI, et cetera, the reason 
that was done -- and I don't want to be rude to your 
mom and I don't want to be rude to Mr. Bradford, but 
it's fair for me to assume that they're not very 
sophisticated people in terms of those type of 
business dealings; isn't that true? 
A. I can't make a characterization like that. 
Q. Is it fair to say that you're more 
sophisticated than they are? 
A. I'm not going to say I'm better than 
somebody, okay? I'm not going to say I'm more 
sophisticated or I'm smarter than somebody else. I 
think everybody has a relative range of normality. 
Q. You have graduated from college? 
115 
A. Yes. That doesn't mean you're smarter. 
Q. I agree. And I don't know if you finished 
law school, but you at least had some training at law 
school? 
A. Sure. 
Q. I believe your previous testimony was when 
you were dealing with Mr. Bradford and your mom and 
doing these types of things, you were trying to be as 
open and honest with them as you could and keep them 
informed? 
A. Yes, absolutely. 
Q. But you didn't inform Mr. Bradford that she 
had signed that quit claim deed, did you? 
A. We discussed it the whole time. I mean we 
knew right when we went in, we said, "Okay, we're 
going to develop the property, where's the money going 
to go when they get the money?" And they said, "Well, 
it's only fair half goes to his side and half goes to 
the other." 
Q. My question is when the quit claim deed was 
signed did you tell Mr. Bradford it had been signed? 
A. Not in so many words, no. 
MR. PATTON: Thank you. 
(End of partial transcript) 
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GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Hi Mr. George K. Bradford filed for divorce from his wife, Mrs. 
Andrea O. Bradford, on June 10, 1997. In the same complaint, he 
alleged Mrs. Bradford had fraudulently conveyed a property 
interest in the couple's home to her son, Mr. James A. Demita, a 
named defendant. This appeal thus arises from two related cases 
tried together by agreement of the parties and the trial court. 
Mrs. Bradford appeals che trial court's order setting aside her 
conveyance of her interest in the home to Mr. Demita and the 
trial court's order awarding the home entirely to Mr. Bradford. 
We affirm the order setting aside the conveyance, but reverse the 
award of the home to Mr. Bradford and remand for further 
proceedings regarding property division between Mr. and Mrs. 
Bradford. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1|2 The Bradfords were married in June 1985. Each had been 
married once before, and each had at least one child from the 
prior marriage. No children were born of their marriage to each 
other. 
^3 During their marriage, the couple lived in Mr. Bradford's 
home located in Spanish Fork, Utah. Mr. Bradford was raised in 
this home, which his grandfather and father both owned before 
him. Before marrying Mrs. Bradford, he received title to the 
home from his father as a gift. Several improvements were made 
to the home during the couple's marriage, including a repaired 
roof and septic system, the addition of a new furnace, and 
plumbing work connecting the home to the city's water supply. 
Mr. Bradford paid for these improvements with funds he received 
before the marriage as part of a settlement with Geneva Steel. 
Mrs. Bradford's only contribution to the improvements consisted 
of making phone calls and arranging for the work to be done. The 
undisputed present estimated value of the home is $180,000. 
1)4 In 1989, approximately four years after they married, Mr. 
Bradford transferred the home by way of warranty deed to himself 
and his wife as "joint tenants with full rights of survivorship 
and not as tenants in common." Three years later, however, Mr. 
Bradford filed for divorce and asked that the home and real 
property be awarded to him. That action was dismissed in 1993 
after the parties reunited. 
H5 The couple continued to have marital difficulties, and Mr. 
Bradford threatened divorce many times. Nevertheless, in 1996, 
the couple engaged in a joint business venture with Mrs. 
Bradford's son, Mr. Demita, to develop property, upon which the 
home was located. Mr. Demita was to receive twenty-five percent 
of the profits for his assistance in developing the property. At 
the time of this business arrangement, Mr. Demita was living with 
the Bradfords and had done so rent-free since December 1995. 
1J6 In July 1996, shortly after the property venture began, Mr. 
Bradford arrived home to find several engineers in the house. He 
was upset with the slow progress of the project and had an 
argument with Mrs. Bradford. This time, the argument was severe, 
and the couple again discussed divorce. 
%7 On August 8, 1996, Mrs. Bradford transferred her interest in 
the home by way of quit claim deed to her son, Mr. Demita. She 
later claimed this transfer was for "estate planning purposes." 
Mr. Demita gave Mrs. Bradford $10 as consideration for the 
property transfer. Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. Demita told Mr. 
Bradford about this transaction, and Mrs. Bradford continued to 
live in the home. Mr. Bradford discovered the existence of the 
quit claim deed several months later when his daughter went to 
the County Recorder's Office to verify Mr. Demita*s 
representations that the home and property had been rezoned for 
development. She found the quit claim deed and discovered the 
property, in fact, had not been rezoned. 
^8 On June 10, 1997, soon after he learned about the deed to 
Mr. Demita, Mr. Bradford filed a complaint for divorce against 
Mrs. Bradford and included Mr. Demita as a party to the action. 
After a bench trial, the court awarded Mr. Bradford a divorce. 
The trial court also found that the transfer between Mrs. 
Bradford and Mr. Demita was fraudulent and set aside the 
conveyance. In awarding the subject property, the trial court 
concluded the house and real property were not partitionable and 
would have to be refinanced or sold if awarded to both Mr. 
Bradford and Mrs. Bradford. The court thus awarded the home and 
the real property to Mr. Bradford. In addition, the court 
awarded Mrs. Bradford alimony in the amount of $600 a month and 
divided equally the remaining marital property, including bank 
accounts, an IRA account, retirement funds, and the cash value of 
an insurance policy. 
%9 Mrs. Bradford moved the trial court to amend its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, but the court denied her motion. 
Mrs. Bradford and her son then filed this appeal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
|^10 This case involves three critical issues. First, did Mrs. 
Bradford's conveyance of her joint tenancy interest in the home 
constitute a fraudulent transfer? Because this issue involves 
both questions of law and of fact, we review the trial court's 
findings of fact for clear error. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 
1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). "In contrast, we review a trial court's 
conclusions as to the legal effect of a given set of found facts 
for correctness." Id. {citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994)). Nevertheless, "[w]e may still grant the trial 
court discretion in its application of the law to a given fact 
situation." Id. 
^11 Second, if the transfer was fraudulent, and therefore void, 
was the nature of the property marital or separate? This issue 
primarily presents a question of law; therefore, we review the 
trial court's legal conclusions concerning the nature of property 
for correctness. See Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 836 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (considering whether 401(k) plan is marital 
property). 
Hl2 Third, did the trial court properly award the subject 
property entirely to Mr. Bradford? In deciding this question, we 
acknowledge that "[t]rial courts have considerable discretion in 
determining alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, 
and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 
1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Fraudulent Conveyance 
1|l3 We first address the fraudulent conveyance issue. The trial 
court concluded the transfer was fraudulent under the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1 to -13 
(1998) , and declared the transfer void. 
1|l4 A fraudulent transfer in Utah first requires a creditor-
debtor relationship. Essentially, a fraudulent transfer occurs 
when a debtor transfers substantially all his or her assets to 
another to defraud a creditor or avoid a debt. A "creditor," 
according to section 25-6-2(4), "means a person who has a claim." 
A "'claim' means a right to payment, whether or not the right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, 
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, 
secured, or unsecured." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(3) (1998) 
(emphasis added); see also Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 206, 48 
P.2d 513, 516 (1935) (holding persons having tort claim against 
grantor that was not reduced to judgment at time of conveyance 
are "creditors"). 
1115 Although no Utah cases directly address whether a husband or 
wife becomes a creditor of his or her spouse when contemplating 
divorce, the Oregon Supreme Court's statement on the subject is 
helpful to our analysis: 
In Weber v. Rothchild, 15 Or. 385, 388-89, 15 
P. 650, 2 Am. St. Rep. 162 (1887), we held 
that a person in the position of plaintiff 
may maintain a suit to set aside a 
transaction which may defeat her recovery and 
rights in a contemplated suit for divorce. 
This rule prevails in other jurisdictions 
that have considered the matter. 
We conclude, as did the trial court, 
that the conveyance by deed of April 14, 
1972, was obtained by fraud to hinder or 
prevent plaintiff's recovery of [defendant's] 
equitable interest in the fourplex, in the 
divorce suit, and is therefore set aside and 
held to be void. 
Adamson v. Adamson, 541 P.2d 460, 466 (Or. 1975) (citations 
omitted). 
1|l6 In this case, the trial court determined that " [p] ursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(4) and § 25-6-5 Mr. Bradford is a 
creditor of Mrs. Bradford in that he has a claim to the real 
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property which Mrs. Bradford deeded to her son, Mr. Demita." 
The trial court based this conclusion on the fact that Mr. 
Bradford had threatened divorce just weeks before Mrs. Bradford 
made the transfer. That conclusion is consistent with the Oregon 
Supreme Court's analysis in Adamson, which we adopt. In our 
view, the trial court correctly concluded Mr. Bradford was, 
indeed, a creditor of Mrs. Bradford, given that his claim to the 
house--although not reduced to judgment in a divorce proceeding--
had arisen through recent threats of divorce. We note this 
conclusion is consistent with our supreme court's admonition to 
construe the statute liberally "to reach all artifices and 
evasions designed to rob the Act of its full force and effect." 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987); see also 
Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 291, 351 P.2d 959, 962 (1960) 
("'[A]11 statutes made against fraud should be liberally and 
beneficially expounded to suppress the fraud.'") (quoting Twyne's 
Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601)). 
\\1 Having concluded Mr. Bradford is a creditor of Mrs. 
Bradford, we next examine whether Mrs. Bradford made a fraudulent 
transfer of her joint tenancy interest to her son. According to 
Utah's Fraudulent Transfer Act, "A transfer made . . . by a 
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's 
claim arose before or after the transfer was made . . . , if the 
debtor made the transfer . . . (a) with actual intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 
25-6-5(1) (1998). 
1[l8 A creditor who claims a debtor transferred property with 
actual intent to defraud under section 25-6-5(1) (a) must 
establish that claim by clear and convincing evidence. See 
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 462 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Nevertheless, " [f]raudulent intent is ordinarily 
considered a question of fact, and 'may be inferred from the 
presence of certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud."1" Id. 
at 462 (quoting Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420, 423 
(Utah 1986)) (other citations and footnotes omitted). Utah's 
statute codifies those factors historically considered by the 
common law as indicia or badges of fraud in section 25-6-5(2), 
which states: 
To determine "actual intent" under Subsection 
(1)(a), consideration may be given, among 
other factors, to whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an 
insider;m 
1. The relevant portion of the Act includes in its definition of 
(continued...) 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control 
of the property transferred after the 
transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed 
or concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or 
obligation was incurred, the debtor had been 
sued or threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the 
debtor's assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received 
by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to 
the value of the asset transferred . . . . 
See also Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 553, 15 P.2d 1051, 1056 
(1932) (holding conveyances between near relatives, calculated to 
prevent creditor from realizing on claim, are subject to rigid 
scrutiny); Givan, 351 P.2d at 962 (holding transactions among 
close relatives receive close scrutiny but close relationship 
does not necessarily mean transaction is invalid). 
Hl9 The trial court used these factors in concluding Mrs. 
Bradford had actual intent to defraud Mr. Bradford. 
Specifically, the trial court found "that the transfer was 
concealed from Mr. Bradford, Mrs. Bradford continues to live in 
the house as before, Mr. Bradford had threatened Mrs. Bradford 
with divorce a matter of weeks before the transfer, and the 
transfer was substantially all of the assets that Mrs. Bradford 
believed that she had." 
1)20 We, too, conclude these badges of fraud are adequate to show 
actual intent by Mrs. Bradford to fraudulently convey her 
interest to her son. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
findings (including those denominated as conclusions) that the 
transfer was fraudulent and void. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-
8(1) (a) (1998) . 
II. Nature of Property 
1121 Our conclusion that the transfer is void necessarily 
restores the joint tenancy title to the home in Mr. and Mrs. 
Bradford. Nevertheless, Mr. Bradford argues the property should 
be treated as separate property because he inherited it, brought 
it into the marriage, and maintained and improved it. The trial 
(...continued) 
an "insider" a person who is "a relative of the debtor." Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-6-2(7) (a) (i) (1998) . 
c 
court, he contends, was therefore correct in awarding the subject 
property to him despite its joint tenancy status. 
K22 Utah law provides that a spouse may transfer his or her 
interest in separately acquired property into the marital estate. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-3 (1998). A transfer of otherwise 
separate property to a joint tenancy with the grantor's spouse is 
generally presumed to be a gift, see 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 
103(a), at 397 (1991) (citing Kramer v. Kramer, 709 S.W.2d 157, 
159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)), and, when coupled with an evident 
intent to do so, effectively changes the nature of that property 
to marital property. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 
307-08 (Utah 1988); see also Bonne11 v. Bonnell. 344 N.W.2d 123, 
126 (Wis. 1984) (stating spouse may transfer separate property 
into marital estate and "separate property transferred into joint 
tenancy becomes part of the marital estate"); cf. Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980) (finding trial court did 
not abuse discretion in awarding home held in joint tenancy to 
wife when "there was no intention by [wife] to create a one-half 
property interest in [husband], nor any expectation by [husband] 
that he had received a one-half property interest"). 
1|23 In Mortensen, our supreme court considered how property 
inherited during a marriage should be divided upon divorce. 
After examining the law in other jurisdictions, the court 
announced that, as a general rule, "property acquired by one 
spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage [should be 
awarded] to that spouse, together with any appreciation or 
enhancement of its value." Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308 ;2 see also 
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
("[E]quity [generally] requires that each party retain the 
separate property he or she brought into the marriage."). This 
rule applies 
unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her 
efforts or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of 
that property, thereby acquiring an equitable 
interest in it, . . . or (2) the property has 
been consumed or its identity lost through 
2. Although the subject property in Mortensen was inherited 
during the couple's marriage, subsequent courts have applied the 
Mortensen ruling to property inherited before marriage. See, 
e.g., Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) ("f"[E]ach party should, in general, receive the real and 
personal property he or she brought to the marriage or inherited 
during the marriage."1" (Quoting Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 306.) 
(Alteration in original.) (Other citations omitted.)). 
commingling or exchanges or where the 
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an 
interest therein to the other spouse. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 380 (emphasis in original). 
1|24 In this case, the record is clear, and the trial court 
found, that Mr. Bradford conveyed his interest in the home to 
himself and his wife as "joint tenants with full rights of 
survivorship and not as tenants in common." According to the 
trial testimony, Mr. Bradford intended at that time to give a 
one-half interest in the home to his wife.3 Nothing in the trial 
court's findings or the record indicates otherwise. We therefore 
conclude the transfer of Mr. Bradford's separate property to his 
wife as a joint tenant with himself effectively transformed the 
subject property from Mr. Bradford's separate property into 
marital property. 
III. Property Award 
1125 Our determination regarding the property's nature does not 
end our inquiry, for we must also decide whether the trial court 
properly awarded the home, even though marital property, entirely 
to Mr. Bradford. 
"We afford the trial court 'considerable 
latitude in adjusting financial and property 
interests, and its actions are entitled to a 
presumption of validity.' Accordingly, 
changes will be made in a trial court's 
property division determination in a divorce 
action 'only if there was a misunderstanding 
or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, the 
evidence clearly preponderated against the 
3. Mr. Bradford testified as follows: 
Q: What do you remember about [your 
discussion with your daughter concerning 
the joint tenancy]? Did you ever have a 
concern that [Mrs. Bradford] would get 
all of the property if you died first? 
A: No, I didn't. 
Q: You never worried about that? 
A: Well, I signed it expecting that--her 
name on there expecting that she would 
only get half of it. 
Q: And that was your intention, wasn't it? 
A: Yes. 
Q 
findings, or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion.f" 
Thomas v. Thomas, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
(quoting Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 1992) (quoting 
Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988))). 
1)26 Generally, in a divorce proceeding " [e] ach party is presumed 
to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty 
percent of the marital property." Id. (alteration in original) 
(citations and additional quotation marks omitted). This 
presumptive rule of thumb, however, does not supersede the trial 
court's broad equitable power to distribute marital property, 
regardless of who holds title. See Finlayson. 874 P.2d at 849 
("'Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have long held that 
once a court has determined something is marital property, the 
court may distribute it equitably, notwithstanding which party's 
name appears on the title.'" (Citation omitted.)); Haumont, 793 
P.2d at 424 n.l ("[T]he trial court may, in the exercise of its 
broad discretion, divide the property equitably, regardless of 
its source or time of acquisition."); Naranio, 751 P.2d at 1146 
("There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of 
properties in a divorce action."). A trial court may elect to 
distribute marital property unequally when the circumstances and 
needs of the parties dictate a departure from the general rule 
(e.g., to enable one party to fulfill an alimony or child support 
obligation). See Thomas, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25; see also 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) (holding trial 
courts should be guided by general purpose of property division, 
"which is to allocate the property in a manner which best serves 
the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their 
separate lives"); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 n.l 
(Utah 1987) ("In determining whether a certain division of 
property is equitable, . . . the relative abilities of the 
spouses to support themselves after the divorce are pertinent to 
an equitable . . . division of the fixed assets of the 
marriage."); Cox v. Cox. 877 P.2d 1262, 1269-70 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (affirming award to husband of marital home previously 
owned by husband but conveyed to wife in joint tenancy just 
before marriage; trial court found marriage was of short 
duration, no children were born, and couple married later in 
life). 
%21 An unequal division of marital property, however, is only 
justified when the trial court "memorialize[s] in commendably 
detailed findings" the exceptional circumstances supporting the 
distribution. Thomas, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25; see also 
Haumont, 793 P.2d at 425 (holding property division must be 
supported by adequate factual findings). In this case, the trial 
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court's only finding justifying the award of the home to Mr, 
Bradford was that "the house and property is in fact not 
partitionable as it contains a residence, road and river 
frontage. If an interest were to be conveyed the house would 
have to be refinanced or sold."4 This finding is insufficient, 
by itself, to support an award of the marital home entirely to 
Mr. Bradford. Trial courts often order a sale of marital 
property and equitably divide the proceeds between the parties. 
See, e.g., Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1982). A 
trial court may also allow one spouse to "buy out" the other 
spouse's interest in marital property. See, e.g., id. The 
trial court made no adequate finding explaining why either of 
these two remedies was not appropriate for the parties in this 
case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's award of the 
marital home solely to Mr. Bradford. 
i|28 Nevertheless, our role is not to supplant the trial court's 
function in making a property distribution; the trial court is in 
a much better position to determine a proper remedy. Moreover, 
an award of the subject property in this case has an integral 
relationship to the trial court's other orders concerning alimony 
and other property. We therefore remand this case to the trial 
court to determine these matters in light of our conclusion that 
the subject property is marital, not separate, property. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
112 9 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Qid^l &>• BU&*4<) 
C^udith M. B i l l i n g s , Judge 7-
4. We note, also, that the parties at one time, at least, 
contemplated development and sale of the property and had 
enlisted Mr. Demita's assistance in doing so. 
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ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon petitioners' motion 
filed on January 18, 2000, for a thirty (30)-day enlargement of 
time to file a petition for writ of certiorari. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for enlargement of time 
to file a petition for writ of certiorari is granted pursuant to 
Rule 48(e) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The petition 
for writ of certiorari is due to be filed with the Utah Supreme 
Court on or before February 16, 2000. 
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